Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the Basket? by Shannon, Brian D.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 44 
Issue 2 Winter 1995 Article 2 
1995 
Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the Basket? 
Brian D. Shannon 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Brian D. Shannon, Debarment and Suspension Revisited: Fewer Eggs in the Basket?, 44 Cath. U. L. Rev. 
363 (1995). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol44/iss2/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
ARTICLES
DEBARMENT AND SUSPENSION REVISITED:
FEWER EGGS IN THE BASKET?
Brian D. Shannon *
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit made the
following comment during its review of a due process challenge to a com-
pany's suspension from obtaining government contracts:
A small business choosing to put nearly all its eggs in one Gov-
ernment contracts basket must be expected to bear some re-
sponsibility for the risk that that basket could, as a result of the
contractor's misconduct, temporarily or even permanently be
snatched away-with the required procedural safeguards here
at issue.'
Debarment and suspension are remedies that the government may utilize
to preclude businesses and individuals from obtaining new government
contracts, grants, loans, or other benefits for either a temporary or stated
period.2 Both remedies can be either statutory or administrative in na-
* Professor of Law, Texas Tech University School of Law. B.S., summa cum laude,
Angelo State University, 1979; J.D., with high honors, The University of Texas School of
Law, 1982. This Article is the result of a study undertaken by the author on behalf of the
Administrative Conference of the United States.
1. ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 684 n.31 (Fed. Cir. 1984). The court
offered these remarks as part of its analysis that a suspension involves a protected liberty
interest, not a life or property interest, and that, in theory, a suspended contractor still can
obtain non-government contract work. I& For a detailed discussion of these due process
issues, see infra notes 105-91 and accompanying text.
2. With respect to government contracts, see Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR),
48 C.F.R. § 9.4 (1993). These regulations define a "debarment" as the exclusion of "a
contractor from Government contracting and Government-approved subcontracting for a
reasonable, specified period." Id. § 9.403. A "suspension" is an agency action "to disqual-
ify a contractor temporarily from Government contracting and Government-approved sub-
contracting." I& Thus, both of these actions cause a contractor to become ineligible to
receive new government contract awards. Generally, an agency may impose a debarment
for a period of up to three years (inclusive of any preceding period of suspension). See id
§ 9.406-4(a). Furthermore, an agency may impose a debarment commensurate with the
seriousness of the cause or causes, id., and may extend the length of debarment "to protect
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ture.3 More importantly, a debarment or suspension can impact a busi-
ness that depends significantly on government work. Indeed, contractors
and grantees may fear a debarment or suspension far more than criminal
or civil sanctions because of the potentially adverse economic effect on
their operations.4 On the other hand, the federal government must have
the ability, when warranted, to exclude entities that are untrustworthy,
dishonest, or otherwise lacking in business integrity for at least some rea-
sonable period.
As a result of the tension between the government's interest in protect-
ing itself from irresponsible concerns and private entities' interest in
avoiding exclusion from governmental programs, the debarment and sus-
pension process has engendered much litigation, procedural experimenta-
tion, and policy debate. For the most part, the federal government has
been able to use debarment and suspension effectively to help protect the
public fisc. But contractors and other private businesses have been suc-
cessful in achieving greater procedural protections against abusive or pu-
nitive actions. Nonetheless, debarment and suspension remain constant
threats when dealing with the federal government.
This Article provides an analysis and assessment of the historical and
continuing evolution of the procedures attendant with the debarment and
suspension process.5 Part II of this Article recounts the early reports
the Government's interest." Id. § 9.406-4(b); see Coccia v. Defense Logistics Agency, No.
89-6544, 1992 WL 345106, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 12, 1992) (upholding the agency's imposi-
tion of a fifteen-year debarment). An agency may maintain a suspension for up to 18
months (or even longer if legal proceedings have commenced during that period). See 48
C.F.R. § 9.407-4(b). With respect to grants and other nonprocurement government bene-
fits, the regulations include similar definitions for debarment and suspension and their re-
spective durations. See 28 C.F.R. § 67 (1993). These regulations are a representative
version of a common rule for nonprocurement debarment and suspension that a number of
agencies adopted at the same time. See infra notes 53-54 and accompanying text. Subse-
quent references in this Article to provisions of the common rule generally will be to this
particular version.
3. Much of the discussion in this Article will focus on procedural issues relating to
administrative debarment and suspension; however, I also have addressed statutory debar-
ment and suspension in Part IX of the Article. See infra notes 317-56 and accompanying
text.
4. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION COMM. ON DEBARMENT & SUSPENSION, THE
PRACTITIONER's GUIDE TO SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT 5-6 (1994) [hereinafter ABA
PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE]. The Debarment and Suspension Committee of the American
Bar Association's (ABA) Public Contract Law Section prepared this monograph for initial
distribution at the ABA's annual meeting in August 1994. This ABA Practitioner's Guide
is an excellent compilation of information concerning the debarment and suspension
process.
5. As part of my research for preparing this Article, I contacted a number of agency
officials involved in the debarment and suspension process. I also sent letters to selected
members of the private bar involved in a government contracts practice, including corpo-
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commissioned by the Administrative Conference of United States
(ACUS). Part III focuses on the evolution of the current procedures for
both procurement and nonprocurement debarment and suspension activi-
ties. It analyzes the key differences between those procedures and the
difficulties in resolving these differences. Part IV reviews significant
court decisions that influenced the evolution of government-wide debar-
ment and suspension regulations, such as due process standards and the
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Part V of this Article
questions whether greater process such as post-deprivation hearings for
contractors facing debarment or suspension should be provided and con-
cludes that the existing regulations provide adequate due process.
Notwithstanding the fundamental fairness of the regulations, Part VI of
this Article argues that a lack of uniformity in implementing and applying
agency procedures exists. Specifically, Parts VII, VIII, and IX address
respectively the lack of uniformity concerning the period of debarment,
the mitigating factors agencies consider when imposing debarment or sus-
pension of contractors, and the punitive nature with which agencies are
imposing debarments. This Article concludes that although some debar-
ment and suspension regulations are not implemented or applied uni-
formly, on balance the current regulations are fair and reasonable and do
not warrant revision.
rate counsel and members of private firms. I obtained a number of written responses and
conducted personal interviews with several of those who responded. Although not a for-
mal survey, many of the comments I received were helpful, and I attempted to incorporate
some of these remarks and ideas into my analysis.
Specifically, with respect to agency officials, I received extended comments from repre-
sentatives of the Air Force, Army, Navy, General Services Administration (GSA), Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency (EPA), Department of Energy, and the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD). Several of these letters were from agency offi-
cials who indicated that their comments were based on their personal points of view and
did not necessarily reflect the official positions of their respective agencies. I have honored
their requests not to attribute statements from these letters to them. I also received writ-
ten comments from another eight attorneys involved in the process either as corporate
counsel or with law firms. In addition, I must express appreciation to Richard Bednar,
Chair of the Debarment and Suspension Committee of the ABA's Public Contract Law
Section, for allowing me to meet with him and members of his committee and for sharing
with me an early draft of the ABA Practitioner's Guide. (Mr. Bednar is also a former
debarring official for the Army). I also am grateful to Janet Cook, debarring official for
the Air Force, and Alan Heifetz, Chief Administrative Law Judge of HUD, and his col-
leagues, for taking time to meet with me to discuss issues involving the process.
I have drawn several portions of this Article from selected segments of my earlier re-
search in this area, particularly with regard to certain constitutional due process discus-
sions. See Brian D. Shannon, The Government-Wide Debarment and Suspension
Regulations After a Decade-A Constitutional Framework-Yet, Some Issues Remain in
Transition, 134 MrL. L. RaV. 1 (1991), reprinted in 21 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 370 (1992). Finally, I
wish to thank Tiffani Barnes for her invaluable research assistance.
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II. EARLY ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
UNITED STATES AcriviTy
In 1961 and 1962, the temporary Administrative Conference of the
United States (Temporary Conference) conducted an impressive study of
the then-existing practices and procedures for the debarment and suspen-
sion of federal contractors.6 Cyrus R. Vance, who at that time served as
Department of Defense General Counsel, headed the committee respon-
sible for submitting this extensive report.7 The report included nine rec-
ommendations for action,' all of which the Temporary Conference
adopted. 9 Specifically, the Temporary Conference report expressed con-
cern in four major problem areas in the debarment and suspension pro-
cess: (1) a lack of procedural safeguards; (2) insufficient rules regarding
the grounds and scope of a debarment action; (3) the length and disparity
of debarment periods; and (4) the merging of prosecutorial and judicial
functions in debarment decision making.' °
6. See Paul H. Gantt & Irving R.M. Panzer, Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on
Government Contracts and the Administrative Conference of the United States, 5 B.C. IN-
DUS. & COM. L. REv. 89, 90-91 (1963) (explaining that, in 1961, an Executive Order estab-
lished the Temporary Conference to conduct studies of various aspects of administrative
law, including debarment and suspension, until its termination date on December 31,
1962).
7. Id at 90.
8. John M. Steadman, "Banned in Boston-and Birmingham and Boise and...": Due
Process in the Debarment and Suspension of Government Contractors, 27 HASTINGS L.J.
793, 803 (1976). Professor Steadman's article was based upon a report he prepared for the
Administrative Conference of the United States (ACUS). Id. at 793 n.*.
9. Id at 803. In formulating iis recommendations, the study committee obtained the
views of a number of federal agencies and a special subcommittee of the ABA. Id. For a
reprint of the full report and recommendations regarding the debarment and suspension
procedures, see SENATE SUBCOMM. ON ADMIN. PRAC. AND PROC., SELECTED REPORTS OF
THE ADhINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNtrED STATES, S. Doc. No. 24, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. 265-95 (1963) [hereinafter TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT]. Although the
agencies appeared to have mixed views about the proposals, the committee believed that
its recommendations were necessary to afford "fair governmental administration." Idt at
281.
10. TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 276-80. With respect to the
lack of procedural safeguards, the committee identified several problems, including: a lack
of notice or "opportunity to know the reasons, or the evidence for the suspension"; the
rare practice of holding adversary hearings in debarment cases; the fact that agencies
would extend other agencies' debarments without notice; widespread use of de facto de-
barments by contracting officers without affording affected businesses notice or means to
challenge the action; and a lack of published regulations for implementing certain statutory
debarments. Id. at 276-78. In terms of the rules for the grounds and scope of debarments,
the committee criticized the use of "vague, generalized criteria" for imposing debarments
and the absence of criteria for extending debarments to affiliated businesses or individuals.
Id. at 278-79. As to the periods of debarment, the committee observed that businesses
suspected of criminal conduct had been subject to indefinite suspensions. Id. at 279. The
regulations did not provide a mechanism for lifting a debarment upon a showing of present
[Vol. 44:363
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The first and perhaps most important recommendation called for a no-
tice of proposed debarment to precede a debarment, and when factual
disputes are relevant to the debarment action, the government would
provide an opportunity for "a trial-type hearing" before a neutral agency
board or hearing examiner." This recommendation contemplated the
employment of formal adjudication similar to that of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA). 12 The recommendation specifically limited the
hearing opportunity, however, to cases involving disputed factual issues.'
3
The Temporary Conference report also recommended that agencies
provide parties subject to potential debarment with a notice of proposed
debarment supported by reasons for the proposed action.14 The Tempo-
rary Conference indicated that in certain classes of cases, the notice of
proposed debarment also could impose a temporary suspension of the
affected concern' 5 within suggested time limits.' 6 In addition, the Con-
responsibility. Id. at 279-80. The committee also noted that the military departments were
debarring based on criminal convictions for the maximum five-year period without regard
to the duration of the related criminal convictions. Id. at 280. Finally, the committee criti-
cized the agencies for not separating the functions of those who proposed debarment and
those who made the final decisions. Id
11. Id at 267 (Recommendation 29-1(a)). Professor Steadman described this recom-
mendation as being the report's "central and probably most controversial" suggestion. See
Steadman, supra note 8, at 804.
12. TEMPORARY CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 9, at 281 (citing the Administra-
tive Procedure Act, § 7(c), 5 U.S.C. § 556(d)).
13. d at 283 (revealing that the ABA had provided comments suggesting that the
opportunity for a hearing was not broad enough because it only applied when there were
factual disputes). The ABA believed that in many cases involving undisputed facts, other
relevant factors still could militate against the need to debar the affected party. I& In
those cases, the ABA wanted contractors to have "an opportunity to explain and to
demonstrate present responsibility as a contractor." Id At the same time, however, it
acknowledged that this was "not an 'adversary hearing' in the sense of an impartial fact
finding." Id Nevertheless, the Temporary Conference committee apparently thought that
any such argument could always be made to the debarring official. Id; see also Steadman,
supra note 8, at 804 n.40.
14. TEMPORARY CONFRENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 267 (Recommendations 29-
1(a), (c)). Recommendation 29-6 similarly suggested that debarment decisions should be
in writing complete with findings, conclusions, and reasons. Id at 269 (stating that the
Temporary Conference also expected these written decisions to be provided to the affected
individual or firm).
15. Id at 267 (Recommendation 29-2(a)). This recommendation would apply to cases
involving criminal convictions or civil judgments affecting contractor responsibility "or
upon probable cause for belief that an individual or firm has committed fraud or has en-
gaged in other conduct showing a substantial lack of present responsibility." Id.
16. Id (stating that temporary suspensions should be for a reasonable period of time
but should not exceed the time limits set forth in Recommendation 29-2(b)). In cases in
which the government indicts the suspended contractor within a year of the notice of pro-
posed action, the committee recommended that the suspension continue through trial and
for an additional 120 days. Id at 268 (Recommendation 29-2(b)(1)). If the government
did not commence criminal proceedings within one year, then the Temporary Conference
1995]
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ference called for the publication of agency procedural rules regarding
debarments to "be uniform to the extent practicable, and [to] provide for
a fair and speedy determination. 
' 17
The Temporary Conference addressed the problems associated with
the grounds and scope of debarment by recommending that all agencies
explicitly delineate and publish the grounds for debarment in their regu-
lations.'" In doing so, the agencies again were to strive for uniformity. 9
Finally, in terms of the duration of debarments, the Temporary Confer-
ence recommended that regulations be amended to require that debar-
ments be commensurate with the gravity of the underlying conduct and
last for a reasonable and clearly stated period of time not to exceed three
years.2 Moreover, the Conference suggested that the procedures allow
the agency to lift the debarment once a contractor demonstrates present
responsibility to perform contracts or subcontracts. 2' Consistent with
these suggestions, the Temporary Conference also asked Congress "to
amend the Buy American and Davis-Bacon Acts to remove the absolute
called for the suspension to terminate unless the Attorney General determined that disclo-
sure of the government's case at a debarment proceeding would harm the ongoing law
enforcement action. Id. In such a situation, the Temporary Conference recommended that
the suspension should remain in place for up to 18 months (or for the duration of trial if
the government brought a fraud action within the 18 months from the initial notice). Id.
In cases not involving likely indictments or civil fraud actions, the Temporary Conference
recommended a limit of 90 days for any suspension, which could be extended for up to
another 90 days upon a written determination by a high ranking agency official. Id. (Rec-
ommendation 29-2(b)(2)).
17. Id at 269 (Recommendation 29-5).
18. Id (Recommendation 29-7(a)).
19. Id In particular, the recommendations included a charge that these regulations
include standards and criteria for identifying and extending debarments to affiliates of
debarred concerns, imputing fraud or other improper conduct from an individual to a busi-
ness, and determining the scope of a debarment in terms of applicability to all or part of a
business or to all or some of its contracts. Id. (Recommendation 29-7(b)). More specifi-
cally, the Temporary Conference indicated that the grounds for debarment should include
"fraud incident to obtaining or performing a government contract or subcontract or any
other conduct showing a serious and present lack of business integrity or business honesty
as a government contractor or subcontractor." Id. at 269-70 (Recommendation 29-7(c)).
Furthermore, the Temporary Conference recommended that any findings of fraud or mis-
conduct "should be based on substantial evidence." Id. at 270.
20. Itd at 270 (Recommendation 29-8). The Temporary Conference recommended
this three-year period except as provided by statute or Executive Order. Id. In response
to this recommendation, several branches of the military objected, preferring the five-year
period then-existing regulations authorized for some cases. See Gantt & Panzer, supra
note 6, at 100.
21. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 270 (Recommendation
29-8).
[Vol. 44:363
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debarment penalties," and to provide agencies with discretion to limit a
debarment upon a proper showing.22
Over a decade after the Temporary Conference issued its report on
debarment and suspension, the ACUS commissioned another report on
the topic from then Professor John M. Steadman, which he submitted in
1975 (Steadman Report).23 After reviewing his findings in light of the
Temporary Conference report, Professor Steadman concluded that the
1962 recommendation to require trial-type hearings in debarment cases
involving disputed facts was "still a sound standard."'  Thereafter, given
the findings in the Steadman report, the ACUS made no further
recommendations.25
Many regulatory, judicial, and statutory developments in the debar-
ment and suspension field have arisen since the last ACUS review under-
taken in the 1975 Steadman report.26 The remainder of this Article will
22. Id
23. See Steadman, supra note 8, at 793 n.* (explaining that the law review article was
based on this report). The article includes a detailed study of the activity in the debarment
and suspension field for the period from 1962 to 1975. Id. at 805-23.
24. Id. at 822 (noting also the government's reluctance and inertia in carrying out this
specific recommendation).
25. Letter from Robert A. Anthony, Chairman, ACUS, to John M. Steadman (Sept.
11, 1975) (on file with author) (commenting that his "only disappointment with [the report]
is that it also is quite persuasive in recommending that we not expend further effort on this
topic").
26. The law of debarment and suspension also has generated a substantial body of
scholarship. Indeed, subsequent to the 1962 Temporary Conference report, a number of
scholars and practitioners, including this author, have commented on various aspects of the
debarment and suspension process. In addition to the articles noted in conjunction with
the discussion above, see John T. Boese, Suspension and Debarment A Primer for the
1990s, 4 ACQUISION IssuEs, June 1994, at 1; Joseph A. Calamari, The Aftermath of Gon-
zalez and Home on the Administrative Debarment and Suspension of Government Contrac-
tors, 17 NEW. ENG. L. REv. 1137 (1982); George M. Coburn, Due Process Issues in
Debarment and Suspension, 42 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 571 (1984); Howard W. Cox, Due
Process Issues in Suspension and Debarment: A Government Perspective, 43 Fed. Cont.
Rep. (BNA) 429 (1985); Paul A. D'Aloisio, Accusations of Criminal Conduct by Govern-
ment Contractors: The Remedies, Problems, and Solutions, 17 Pun. Cornr. L.J. 265 (1987);
W. Jay DeVecchio & Devon Engel, EPA Suspension, Debarment, and Listing: What EPA
Contractors Can Learn from the Defense Industry (and Vice Versa), 22 Pun. CoNT. L.J. 55
(1992); William L. England, Jr., The Fifth Amendment A Double Edge Sword for Govern-
ment Contractors, 18 Pun. CONT. L.J. 601 (1988); Paul L. Friedman, Debarment and Sus-
pension: The Government's Most Powerful Weapons, in FRAUD iN GOVERNMENT
CoNTRACTIrN 291 (1985); James J. Graham, Suspension of Contractors and Ongoing
Criminal Investigations for Contract Fraud Looking for Fairness from a Tightrope of Com-
peting Interests, 14 Pun. CoNT. L.J. 216 (1984); Steven Horowitz, Looking for Mr. Good
Bar: In Search of Standards for Federal Debarment, 14 Pun. CoNr. L.J. 58 (1983); Karl W.
Kabeiseman, Contractor Debarment and Suspension-A Government Perspective, Pun.
CoNT. NEWSL. (A.B.A. Sec. of Pub. Cont. L.) Spring 1984, at 3; Gerald P. Norton, The
Questionable Constitutionality of the Suspension and Debarment Provisions of the Federal
Acquisition Regulations: What Does Due Process Require?, 18 Pun. CONT. L.J. 633 (1988);
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highlight the important aspects of these developments and provide a few
pertinent recommendations.
III. CURRENT PROCEDURES
Both the ACUS Temporary Conference report and the Steadman Re-
port dealt with issues concerning debarment and suspension of govern-
ment contractors.27 Indeed, the bulk of the law in this area relates to
procurement debarment and suspension. In recent years, however, atten-
tion has shifted to nonprocurement debarment and suspension as well. 28
This section focuses on the evolution of the current procedures for both
procurement and nonprocurement debarment and suspension activities.
A. Procurement
The current regulations governing the debarment and suspension of
federal government contractors are set forth in subpart 9.4 of the Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR).29 These provisions became government-
wide regulations in the early 1980s.1° In July of 1981, following the efforts
of an interagency task force and congressional hearings, the Senate Sub-
committee on Oversight of Government Management recommended that
Shannon, supra note 8, at 1; Edwin J. Tomko & Kathy C. Weinberg, After the Fall: Convic-
tion, Debarment, and Double Jeopardy, 21 PUB. CoNT. L.J. 355 (1992); Robert D. Wallick
et al., Suspension and Debarment, in FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT CONTRACrING, supra, at
157; Donna M. Duvall, Comment, Moving Toward a Better-Defined Standard of Public
Interest in Administrative Decisions to Suspend Government Contractors, 36 AM. U. L.
REv. 693 (1987); Lisa A. Everhart, Note, "Graylisting" of Federal Contractors: Transco
Security, Inc. of Ohio v. Freeman and Procedural Due Process Under Suspension Proce-
dures, 31 CATH. U. L. REv. 731 (1982). For related issues, see David A. Churchill & Law-
rence J. O'Connell, New International Consequences of Suspension and Debarment, 7 INT'L
TAX & Bus. LAW. 239 (1989).
For analyses of earlier procedures, see Paul H. Gantt & Irving R.M. Panzer, The Gov-
ernment Blacklist: Debarment and Suspension of Bidders on Government Contracts, 25
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 175 (1956); Note, The Blacklisted Contractor and the Question of
Standing to Sue, 56 Nw. U. L. REv. 811 (1962).
27. See supra notes 6-26 and accompanying text.
28. See infra notes 50-55 and accompanying text (discussing the application of debar-
ment and suspension proceedings to nonprocurement activities).
29. FAR, 48 C.F.R. § 9.4 (1993).
30. Because the procedures began to have government-wide effect in the early 1980s, I
have chosen to begin the focus of my discussion as of that time. The 1975 Steadman report
provides an excellent analysis of the studies and revisions of the regulations in the early to
mid-1970s, which I will not repeat here. See Steadman, supra note 8, at 805-14 (discussing
a study by the Commission on Government Procurement and the regulatory response to a
significant court decision); see also Horne Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C.
Cir. 1972) (discussed infra at notes 113-20 and accompanying text); ABA PRAcrIONER'S
GUIDE, supra note 4, at 25-27 (discussing activity during the same period). There was very
little regulatory activity of any moment in this field in the late 1970s.
[Vol. 44:363
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the federal government issue new debarment and suspension regulations
that would have government-wide effect.31 Thereafter, through the 1980s
and into the 1990s, the federal government has increased greatly its rate
of imposing debarments and suspensions against many of the contractors
with whom it does business. 32 Moreover, agencies throughout the gov-
ernment must honor these actions.33
Similarly, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP) also under-
took the task of developing debarment and suspension regulations when
it issued Policy Letter 81-3, which set forth proposed government-wide
debarment and suspension regulations in the same month that the Senate
subcommittee issued its report.3 In June 1982, the OFPP promulgated
Policy Letter 82-1 delineating final rules for government-wide debarment
and suspension procedures.35 By doing so, the OFPP intended federal
31. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT OF GOV'T MGMT. OF THE COMM. OF
GOV'T AFFAIRS, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS., REFORM OF GOVERNMENT-WIDE DEBARMENT
AND SUSPENSION PROCEDURES 18-19 (Comm. Print 1981) [hereinafter SENATE SUBCOM-
MITTEE REPORT]. Intriguingly, the Senate subcommittee sought greater procedural uni-
formity, reflecting the recommendations of the ACUS Temporary Conference some 20
years earlier, but for very different reasons. Specifically, the Temporary Conference called
for greater uniformity primarily based on concern about perceived unfairness to contrac-
tors. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 278, 293 (discussing the
inadequate rules regarding the grounds and scope of debarment and suggesting appropri-
ate remedies). In contrast, the Senate subcommittee sought uniform, government-wide
procedures because of concerns that agencies did not engage in "effective and aggressive
debarment and suspension" activities. SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT, supra, at 20. The
Senate subcommittee displayed little interest in the rights of contractors, but was con-
cerned because agencies not only bypassed debarment or suspension action when it was
warranted, but also refused to honor the debarments or suspensions of other agencies. Id.
at 11.
32. See ABA PRACrnONER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at 6 (reporting that, in 1993, all
federal agencies suspended or debarred about 6000 entities, of which approximately 1200
were by the Defense Department alone-up from 57 by that agency in 1975); UNITED
STATES GEN. Acct. OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT TO THE CHAIRMAN, HOUSE COMM. ON
Gov'T OPERATIONS, PROCUREMENT: SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT PROCEDURES 3
(1987) [hereinafter GAO BRIEFING REPORT] (stating that the Department of Defense had
doubled its suspension and debarment actions between 1983 and 1985).
33. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.404(a) (explaining that the GSA shall maintain a list of the
names of those whom the federal government debars or suspends entitled, "Parties Ex-
cluded from Procurement Programs"). Consequently, if the GSA lists a contractor, it will
be excluded from any future contracts with the federal government. Id. § 9.405(b). The
GSA list also includes parties excluded under the nonprocurement rules, as discussed be-
low. See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
34. See Proposed OFPP Policy Letter 81-3,46 Fed. Reg. 37,832 (1981) (stating that the
OFPP issued the Policy Letter in July 1981) [hereinafter Policy Letter 81-3]; see also SEN-
ATE SUBCOMMrrEE REPORT, supra note 31, at 1 (indicating that the Senate subcommittee
also released its report in July 1981). The OFPP later published amendments to Policy
Letter 81-3 in September 1981. See 46 Fed. Reg. 45,456 (1981).
35. See OFPP Policy Letter 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. 28,854 (1982) [hereinafter Policy Letter
82-1].
1995]
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agencies to adopt the rules stated in Policy Letter 82-1 initially as part of
the various agencies' procurement regulations and ultimately to include
them in subpart 9.4 of the FAR (upon promulgation of the FAR).36
The government simply did not thrust the suggested rules included in
Policy Letter 82-1 onto the contracting community in a unilateral fashion.
Instead, an intergovernmental task force comprised of legal and procure-
ment experts from various federal agencies considered over six hundred
industry comments regarding the proposed rules.37 Although maintain-
ing that the proposed Policy Letter 81-3 provided "fundamental due pro-
cess" for contractors, the OFPP responded to the public comments by
further refining the procedures.38
The OFPP's rules, as incorporated in the FAR, generally permit an
agency to bar, at least temporarily, a contractor from receiving new con-
tract awards from any federal agency prior to an opportunity for a hear-
ing. Specifically, a federal agency may suspend39 a contractor based on
an indictment or other adequate evidence of charges relating to a lack of
contractor integrity.4 ° An agency also could impose a debarment41 for
36. See id. Policy Letter 82-1 antedated the implementation of the FAR, the unified
government-wide regulation controlling procurement matters, which became effective on
April 1, 1984.
37. Id. at 28,854-55. A number of these comments addressed the contemplated proce-
dures. Id. at 28,856. Many other comments related to the government-wide application of
the rules. Id. at 28,855. As an additional impetus for uniformity, Congress enacted legisla-
tion that required the military departments to honor the debarments and suspensions is-
sued by other federal agencies. See 10 U.S.C. § 2393 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Thus, at the
time of OFPP's efforts, Congress already had directed the Department of Defense to
honor other agencies' procurement debarments and suspensions, and the Senate subcom-
mittee also was advocating action with government-wide effect. Id. The statute specifi-
cally states that "[elxcept as provided in paragraph (2), the Secretary of a military
department may not solicit an offer from, award a contract to,... approve the award of a
subcontract to, an offeror or contractor which to the Secretary's knowledge has been
debarred or suspended by another Federal agency." Id. § 2393(a)(1). Accordingly, the
decision to issue new regulations to require all procurement debarments and suspensions
to have effect throughout the federal government did not come as a surprise.
38. See Policy Letter 82-1, 47 Fed. Reg. at 28,856. The OFPP fashioned these proce-
dures in accordance with the language in some of the earlier court decisions that had ques-
tioned previous agency debarment and suspension practices. See infra notes 105-93 and
accompanying text (discussing cases involving due process claims against agency
procedures).
39. See supra note 2 (defining suspension).
40. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.407 (1993). Specific grounds for suspension include an indict-
ment or other adequate evidence of "fraud or [other] criminal offense[s] in connection
with" public contracts, antitrust violations, offenses such as embezzlement, theft, bribery,
false statements, or other indicia of a lack of business integrity or honesty, and "for any
other cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the present responsibility of
a Government contractor or subcontractor." Id. § 9.407-2(a)(1), (c).
41. See supra note 2 (defining debarment).
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roughly similar grounds as those set forth for a suspension,42 except that a
debarment requires the higher "preponderance of the evidence" stan-
dard.43 Furthermore, the procurement regulations provide that the issu-
ance of a notice of proposed debarment also has the immediate effect of
barring the contractor from receiving new contract awards from any fed-
eral agency.44 Thereafter, the hearing requirements vary depending on
whether a suspension or proposed debarment is involved and whether the
case is based on an indictment, a conviction, or some other evidence.45
With respect to a proposed debarment, the contractor has the right to
submit opposing arguments and information in person, in writing, or
through counsel within thirty days following receipt of the notice. 46 Un-
less a conviction or civil judgment is the basis for the action, the contrac-
tor is entitled to an additional fact-finding hearing if its initial opposition
raises a genuine dispute concerning the facts underlying the proposed de-
barment.47 In the case of a suspension, a contractor similarly is entitled
to submit opposing arguments and information within thirty days follow-
42. Id. § 9.406-2(a), (c); see supra note 40 (listing the grounds for suspension). Other
causes for debarment include "[w]illful failure to perform in accordance with the terms of
one or more contracts; or... [a] history of failure to perform, or of unsatisfactory perform-
ance of, one or more contracts." 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(b)(i), (ii).
43. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(b). Alternatively, a conviction or civil judgment on charges
similar to those delineated as grounds for suspension will provide a sufficient evidentiary
basis for a debarment. See id. § 9.406-2(a)(1) to (4). Consequently, many debarments
follow on the heels of convictions. In the absence of a conviction (or civil judgment),
however, an agency may pursue a debarment when it possesses its own evidentiary basis
for action (even though the Department of Justice may not have pursued or completed any
criminal or civil proceedings). See id. § 9.406-2(b), (c).
44. Id. § 9.405. Although suspensions had immediate government-wide effect under
the OFPP framework prior to 1989, only final debarments had similar government-wide
effect; mere proposals for debarment only barred the contractor from receiving new
awards in the agency that had issued the notice. See 54 Fed. Reg. 19,812, 19,814-15 (1989)
(to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 9.405). A proposed debarment differs under the nonprocure-
ment rules because it does not have immediate preclusive effect (although the nonprocure-
ment regulations authorize an agency to issue a suspension and a notice of proposed
debarment simultaneously). See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
46. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-3(c)(4). This opportunity to submit information and argument in
opposition to the proposed action is consistent with the "'opportunity to explain and to
demonstrate present responsibility as a contractor'" that the ABA sought at the time of
the Temporary Conference recommendations. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT,
supra note 9, at 283; see also supra note 10 (discussing same).
47. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-3(b)(2). The regulations do not designate which agency offi-
cial(s) should preside over the initial agency presentation or any other additional fact-
finding proceedings. In cases involving a conviction or civil judgment, the regulations do
not require any hearing beyond the initial presentation of information in opposition to the
proposed action. See id. § 9.406-3(b). On the other hand, the regulations caution that
"[t]he existence of a cause for debarment [such as a conviction], however, does not neces-
sarily require that the contractor be debarred; the seriousness of the contractor's acts or
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ing receipt of the notice.48 Moreover, except in cases in which an indict-
ment serves as the basis for the suspension or in which the Department of
Justice (DOJ) advises that additional proceedings would jeopardize sub-
stantial governmental interests in pending or contemplated criminal or
civil proceedings, the regulations require an agency to conduct additional
fact-finding proceedings when the contractor's opposition raises ques-
tions of material fact.49 Because the regulations provide that a suspen-
sion or proposed debarment may precede the opportunity for any form of
hearing, contractors long have had concerns about the procedures.
B. Nonprocurement (Grantee)
Prior to the late 1980s, no government-wide regulation comparable to
FAR subpart 9.4 existed, although various agencies had debarment and
suspension programs in effect for nonprocurement programs. In 1986,
however, President Reagan issued Executive Order No. 12,549 to direct
federal agencies to promulgate government-wide debarment and suspen-
sion procedures for nonprocurement activities.5 0 The Executive Order
also called for federal agencies to "[f]ollow government-wide criteria and
government-wide minimum due process procedures when they act to de-
bar or suspend participants in affected programs."'s5 Thus, similar to the
FAR's coverage for procurement programs, Executive Order No. 12,549
directed the use of government-wide procedures with government-wide
effect for nonprocurement programs.52
omissions and any remedial measures or mitigating factors should be considered in making
any debarment decision." Id. § 9.406-1(a) (emphasis added).
48. Id § 9.407-3(c)(5).
49. Id § 9.407-3(c)(6).
50. Exec. Order No. 12,549, 3 C.F.R. 189 (1986). This Executive Order provides, in
pertinent part:
to curb fraud, waste, and abuse in Federal programs, increase agency accountabil-
ity, and ensure consistency among agency regulations concerning debarment and
suspension of participants in Federal programs, it is hereby ordered that:
SEcTiON 1. (a) To the extent permitted by law...
Executive departments and agencies shall participate in a system for debarment
and suspension from programs and activities involving Federal financial and non-
financial assistance and benefits. Debarment or suspension of a participant in a
program by one agency shall have government-wide effect.
Id The order specifically covered "grants, cooperative agreements, contracts of assistance,
loans, and loan guarantees," but excluded "procurement programs and activities, direct
Federal statutory entitlements or mandatory awards, direct awards to foreign governments
or public international organizations, benefits to an individual as a personal entitlement, or
Federal employment." Id.
51. Id
52. See id. The order stated that agencies shall "[n]ot allow a party to participate in
any affected program if any Executive department or agency has debarred, suspended, or
otherwise excluded . . . that party from participation in an affected program." Id.
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In May 1987, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) imple-
mented President Reagan's order by issuing regulatory guidelines enti-
tled the "Guidelines for Nonprocurement Debarment and Suspension.
53
One year later, twenty-eight agencies, through the leadership of the
OMB, simultaneously issued a final common rule to establish uniform
debarment and suspension rules for nonprocurement programs.54 These
rules generally mirrored the approach of FAR subpart 9.4, but contained
some important technical differences.
55
Before addressing these differences, it is important to note that even
after President Reagan's order and the subsequent development of gov-
ernment-wide procedures for nonprocurement debarments and suspen-
sions, a problem existed concerning the two separate sets of debarment
and suspension regulations for procurement and nonprocurement activi-
ties. For example, under the regulations it was clear that a contractor
debarred by an agency pursuant to the FAR could not obtain any new
contracts throughout the federal government.56 Similarly, an entity
debarred from nonprocurement activities could not obtain new grants or
other benefits throughout the government.57 However, the question of
whether a contractor debarred under the FAR could still be eligible for
nonprocurement grants or awards or whether federal agencies could
award new procurement contracts to entities debarred under the non-
procurement regulations remained. Without some additional agency ac-
tion pursuant to the parallel set of debarment regulations, the answer to
both questions was affirmative. Consequently, two different sets of regu-
lations separately governed procurement and nonprocurement debar-
ments and suspensions with no reciprocity between the two actions.
Thus, a procuring agency did not have to accord comity to a nonprocure-
ment debarment or suspension, and a nonprocurement agency did not
have to honor a procurement debarment or suspension.
In response to the gap between procurement and nonprocurement reg-
ulations, President Bush promulgated Executive Order No. 12,689 in
Although agency heads could grant exceptions, the President "intend[ed] that exceptions
to this policy should be granted only infrequently." Id.
53. 52 Fed. Reg. 20,360 (1987).
54. 53 Fed. Reg. 19,160 (1988). Several months later an additional six agencies
adopted the common rules. 54 Fed. Reg. 4722 (1989). Although these rules appear in the
various agencies' regulations, as a final common rule they are, naturally, quite similar. In
future references to the nonprocurement rules, I will provide citations to pertinent sections
of one or more representative provisions.
55. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text (discussing the FAR provisions).
56. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
57. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
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1989.58 The order stated that the OMB "may assist Federal agencies in
resolving differences between the provisions contained in" the two sets of
regulations.5 9
Yet, despite this executive mandate, one key flaw in the Executive Or-
der has prevented the federal government from resolving the reciprocity
problem. The order did not contain an exact effective date. Instead, the
order called for the publication of proposed implementing regulations
within six months "of the resolution of differences" between the two sets
of provisions. 6 As of this writing, however, the OMB has been unable to
resolve differing agency viewpoints. Accordingly, the order's implemen-
tation schedule has not commenced.
On June 8, 1994, the United States Senate passed its version of the
Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994.61 The bill included a pro-
vision intended as a means of further directing the federal government to
require agencies to provide comity between procurement and non-
procurement procedures for debarments and suspensions.62 This provi-
sion called for the issuance of regulations within six months of the
effective date of the Act to make the underlying purposes of the earlier
58. Exec. Order No. 12,689, 3 C.F.R. 235 (1989). The presidential order provided the
following:
to protect the interest of the Federal Government, to deal only with responsible
persons, and to insure proper management and integrity in Federal activities, it is
hereby ordered as follows:
(a) To the extent permitted by law and upon resolution of differences and pro-
mulgation of final regulations ... the debarment, suspension, or other exclusion
of a participant in a procurement activity under the Federal Acquisition Regula-
tion, or in a nonprocurement activity under regulations issued pursuant to Execu-
tive Order No. 12549, shall have governmentwide effect. No agency shall allow a
party to participate in any procurement or nonprocurement activity if any agency
has debarred, suspended, or otherwise excluded ... that party from participation
in a procurement or nonprocurement activity.
Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. Final regulations were to follow one year after the proposed regulations and
were to become effective after an additional 30 days. Id.
61. S. 1587, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994).
62. Id. § 9004. The provision arose from an amendment intended to strengthen "the
debarment and suspension laws and make them uniform." 140 CONG. REc. S6590 (daily
ed. June 8, 1994) (statement of Sen. Levin). Senator Levin, on behalf of Senator Harkin,
also offered an amendment relating to debarment and suspension that required agencies to
"resolve or take corrective action on all Office of Inspector General audit report findings
within a maximum of six months after their issuance" or within six months after receipt of
audit reports by non-government auditors. Id. The latter amendment became part of the
final legislation. See Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 355,
§ 6009, 108 Stat. 3243, 3367 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 251); H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712,
103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 6009, at 130.
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executive orders effective.63 The United States House of Representatives
also passed a version of the Act on June 27, 1994, but it did not include
this debarment comity section.' Subsequently, a congressional confer-
ence committee considered the differences between the two versions and
on August 21, 1994, issued a compromise measure.65 The final bill largely
embraced the debarment and suspension comity provisions that the Sen-
ate version originally contained.66 President Clinton ultimately signed
the bill into law on October 13, 1994.67
One likely reason for congressional consideration of this matter as part
of the 1994 procurement reform legislation is the media attention di-
rected at the Department of Agriculture in 1993 and 1994. For example,
in late 1993, the New York Times published a lengthy report criticizing
the Department of Agriculture for its general lack of debarment activity
and lack of interest in recognizing the debarments of other procuring
63. S. 1587, § 9004. Section 9004, entitled "Uniform Suspension and Debarment,"
provides the following:
(a) Within six months after the date of enactment of this Act, regulations
shall be issued providing that provisions for the debarment, suspension, or other
exclusion of a participant in a procurement activity under the [FAR], or in a non-
procurement activity under regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order No.
12549, shall have government-wide effect. No agency shall allow a party to par-
ticipate in any procurement or nonprocurement activity if any agency has debar-
red, suspended, or otherwise excluded (to the extent specified in the exclusion
agreement) that party from participation in a procurement or nonprocurement
activity.
(b) The Regulations issued pursuant to subsection (a) shall provide that an
agency may grant an exception permitting a debarred, suspended, or otherwise
excluded party to participate in procurement activities of that agency to the ex-
tent exceptions are authorized under the [FAR], or to participate in nonprocure-
ment activities of that agency to the extent exceptions are authorized under
regulations issued pursuant to Executive Order No. 12549.
Id The bill also included language setting forth definitions for procurement and non-
procurement activities. See id. § 9004(c).
64. See H.R. 2238, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) (revealing that House Bill 2238 was a
complete substitute to the Senate version).
65. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712, supra note 62, at 88. It should be noted that the
provisions of the bill relating to debarment and suspension comprise only a tiny portion of
an enactment that provides for sweeping procurement reforms.
66. The substantive portion of the language in the conference committee report
tracked the provisions in the Senate bill; however, the final bill deleted the Senate lan-
guage requiring the new regulations to be published within six months of enactment. See
id.; supra note 63 and accompanying text. On the other hand, the conference bill's general
provision regarding effective dates provides that all proposed regulations covered by the
bill are to be published for comment within 210 days from the date of enactment and are to
be made final within 330 days following enactment. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712, supra note
62, at 168.
67. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-355, 108 Stat. 3243
(to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 251).
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agencies.' By suggesting that the Agriculture Department was the only
federal agency that steadfastly had refused to comply with President Rea-
gan's Executive Order No. 12,549 regarding nonprocurement debarment
and suspension,69 the Times article may have prompted the Department
to adopt a more aggressive approach to debarment and suspension. Nev-
ertheless, the coverage attracted the interest of Congress,7 ° resulting in
Senator Leahy's introduction of a bill to force the Department of Agri-
culture to comply with Executive Order No. 12,549. 1 In addition, the
media attention may have caused a renewed focus on the lack of reci-
procity or comity between procurement and nonprocurement debarments
and suspensions.72 Regardless of the underlying rationale, however, Con-
gress expressly has demanded reciprocity. Yet, despite this legislative
command to implement the comity requirements of President Bush's Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12,689, the two sets of regulations continue to contain
differences. A consensus as to the best way to achieve the required re-
sults has yet to emerge.
C. Key Differences Between the Tw'o Sets of Regulations
Several key differences between the two sets of regulations have
caused difficulties in implementing Executive Order No. 12,689. In ob-
serving those differences, one should consider the question of how these
differences can be resolved and whether the differences need to be re-
solved to achieve the purposes of the Executive Order and the new legis-
lation. One such difference relates to the scope and impact of a notice of
proposed debarment. In the procurement arena, the federal government
has expanded the effects of debarments and suspensions during the last
several years.73 In particular, the government amended the FAR in 1989
68. See Dean Baquet & Diana B. Henriques, Agriculture Companies Still Get Federal
Business Despite Abuses, N.Y. Tinms, Oct. 12, 1993, at Al (highlighting the Agriculture
Department's inaction with respect to dairy contractors that were still participating in the
agency's school lunch program despite fraud convictions and adverse actions by other pro-
curement agencies).
69. See id. at Al, A20.
70. See Dean Baquet, Agriculture Department, in Shift, Will Punish Corrupt Contrac-
tors, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 23, 1993, at Al, Al (reporting that the Agriculture Department had
decided to comply with Executive Order No. 12,549 "under pressure from Congress").
71. See S. 1623, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993).
72. An official within the OMB, who asked to remain anonymous, informed me that
the intense scrutiny of the practices at the Department of Agriculture had motivated that
agency to reach an informal agreement on reciprocity. A number of other agencies had
balked at such reciprocity or comity because of the continuing presence of technical differ-
ences between the two sets of regulations. Telephone Interview with Anonymous Source,
Office of Management and Budget (June 8, 1994).
73. See supra notes 29-49 and accompanying text.
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to require a proposed debarment to have immediate preclusive effect
throughout the federal government.74 Thus, under current regulations a
proposal for debarment has the same government-wide effect as a sus-
pension.75 This approach differs, however, from the rules for non-
procurement debarments.76 A proposed debarment under the
nonprocurement rules does not have the same immediate effect unless
the agency also suspends the affected party.77
Prior to the 1989 amendment to the FAR, a proposed debarment under
the procurement rules only had the effect of barring a contractor from
receiving contracts under the authority of the issuing agency pending a
final debarment determination. 78 Hence, the 1989 amendment corrected
an anomaly in the former process that had allowed a suspension that
could be based merely on an indictment or other adequate evidence of
contractor impropriety to have immediate, government-wide effect. But
this process had required a proposal for debarment, which ultimately
would need to be based on a conviction, civil judgment, or some other
significant cause supported by a preponderance of evidence, to have ef-
fect only within the issuing agency.79
The change in the procurement rules to expand the scope of a pro-
posed debarment should not entitle contractors to any additional pro-
cess.8° Given that the courts generally have upheld suspension
procedures from constitutional due process challenges,81 the debarment
procedures, despite the fact that a proposed debarment now has govern-
ment-wide effect, also must be valid.' Indeed, it is anomalous that the
74. See 54 Fed. Reg. 19,812, 19,814-15 (1989) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a)).
75. 48 C.F.R. § 9.405 (1993); see supra note 44 and accompanying text.
76. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 24.200(a) (1993) (indicating a similar policy for HUD); 28
C.F.R. § 67.200(a) (1993) (showing that DOJ's nonprodurement regulations only give gov-
ernment-wide effect to final debarments and suspensions).
77. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 24.200(a) (HUD); 28 C.F.R. § 67.200(a) (DOJ).
78. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28,642 (1987) (proposing amendments to 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a) and
stating that without the proposal "a contractor proposed for debarment is ineligible for
award, pending a final debarment determination, only within the Federal agency proposing
debarment").
79. Id "This enable[d] a seriously nonresponsible contractor to continue to receive
contract awards from other Federal agencies until a debarment decision [was] rendered."
Itt The General Accounting Office (GAO) recommended this change in 1987. See GAO
BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 32, at 13.
80. See Shannon, supra note 5, at 30-31.
81. See' infra notes 105-93 and accompanying text.
82. See Electro-Methods, Inc. v. United States, 728 F.2d 1471, 1475-76 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(rejecting due process attacks on a pre-indictment suspension based solely on adequate
evidence consisting of two FBI search warrant affidavits). Although a proposal for debar-
ment under the FAR now has the same practical effect as a suspension (an immediate,
government-wide preclusion from obtaining new contract awards), the post-deprivation
process for a proposed debarment is more extensive than for a suspension. First, a debar-
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nonprocurement rules have not undergone similar reform. On the other
hand, the nonprocurement rules do permit agencies to impose a suspen-
sion at the same time they issue a notice of proposed debarment, thereby
achieving a similar result as a notice of proposed debarment under the
FAR.13 Nevertheless, the question as to whether the two sets of regula-
tions should be consistent on the effects of a proposed debarment
remains.
Another problem in the current procurement debarment rules is the
lack of a minimum required showing for an agency to initiate a proposed
debarment. Given a suspension that has government-wide effect must be
based on adequate evidence, a proposal for debarment that also has gov-
ernment-wide effect under the FAR similarly should be premised on at
least adequate evidence. Because courts have likened the adequate evi-
dence standard to the probable cause showing necessary to support a
search warrant under criminal procedure," the regulations should re-
quire a similar probable cause showing to initiate a proposed debarment.
This issue is not as significant under the nonprocurement rules because a
nonprocurement proposed debarment does not have a government-wide
effect.
In 1989, the government also expanded the scope of procurement de-
barments and suspensions by creating a prohibition against most subcon-
tracting by debarred and suspended contractors.85 While prior rules
precluded agencies from consenting to subcontracts with debarred or sus-
pended firms, these firms still could enter into subcontracts that did not
ment requires a higher standard of proof (a conviction, a civil judgment, or a preponder-
ance of evidence). 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (1993). Second, unlike the case of a suspension, an
agency may not limit a contractor's hearing rights in a debarment action based on advice
from the Justice Department. Compare id. § 9.406-3(b)(2), (d)(2) (establishing that a con-
tractor facing debarment may obtain a hearing if it raises a genuine dispute of material
fact) with id. § 9.407-3(b)(2), (d) (providing that an agency may deny a hearing to a con-
tractor who faces suspension if the contractor fails to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact or if the DOJ advises that substantial government interests are at stake). Accordingly,
if the suspension process generally meets constitutional requirements, then clearly the
FAR's more extensive process for processing debarments also must satisfy minimal due
process standards.
83. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.405(a)(2) (1993) (authorizing a suspension upon adequate evi-
dence that a cause for debarment may exist).
84. See Home Bros., Inc. v. Laird, 463 F.2d 1268, 1271 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In practice,
this threshold showing for a proposed debarment should not prove to be an insurmounta-
ble hurdle for the government. Since the ultimate burden of proof for a debarment is the
preponderance of evidence standard, an agency likely will wish to commence a debarment
action with greater evidentiary support than the minimal amount of proof necessary for
adequate evidence.
85. See 54 Fed. Reg. 19,812, 19,815 (1989) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 9.405-2).
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require government approval.86 The current regulations (1) preclude the
government from consenting to any subcontracts with a debarred or sus-
pended contractor, in cases in which government consent is required, in
the absence of a compelling reason determined by the head of the agency
or a designee, and (2) preclude prime contractors from entering into sub-
contracts in excess of $25,000 with any debarred or suspended contractor
"unless there is a compelling reason to do so" and the prime contractor
notifies the agency's contracting officer. 7 This amendment to the FAR
essentially has excluded almost all subcontracting over the small purchase
limitation with contractors who are suspended, debarred, or proposed for
debarment at least at the first tier level. Moreover, a prime contractor's
retention of a debarred or suspended subcontractor could have a bearing
on the prime's overall responsibility.88
As compared to the FAR, the regulations in the nonprocurement arena
are even broader. The nonprocurment regulations require a debarment
or suspension to flow through every tier of participation for most govern-
mental programs.89 Thus, in most situations, a debarred or suspended
86. See 52 Fed. Reg. 28,642 (1987) (proposing amendments to 48 C.F.R. § 9.405-2).
87. 48 C.F.R. § 9.405-2 (1993). For example, Congress has mandated that Defense
Department contractors must require subcontractors to notify them at the time of the
award of any subcontracts for amounts greater than the small purchase threshold whether
those subcontractors are presently debarred, suspended, or otherwise ineligible. 10 U.S.C.
§ 2393(d) (Supp. V 1993). The small purchase threshold is currently $25,000. 10 U.S.C.
§ 2393(g)(3) (1988). Recent procurement streamlining legislation, however, increases the
simplified acquisition threshold to $100,000 and correspondingly amends section 2393(d).
See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712, supra note 62, at 102.
88. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.104-4(a) (1993) (providing that "[dieterminations of prospective
subcontractor responsibility may affect the Government's determination of the prospective
prime contractor's responsibility"); see also Medical Devices of Fall River, Inc. v. United
States, 19 Cl. Ct. 77, 82-83 (1989) (upholding a contracting officer's finding that a contrac-
tor who entered into a subcontract with a debarred contractor for 100% of the contract
items was not a responsible offeror).
89. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 67.200(a), (b) (1993) (requiring the exclusion of persons
debarred or suspended under the nonprocurement rules from being participants or princi-
pals in "primary covered transactions" and "all lower tier covered transactions"). The reg-
ulations define a primary covered transaction to include such nonprocurement transactions
as "grants, cooperative agreements, scholarships, fellowships, contracts of assistance, loans,
loan guarantees, subsidies," and others. Id. § 67.110(a)(1)(i). A lower tier covered trans-
action includes "[a]ny transaction between a participant and a person other than a procure-
ment contract for goods or services, regardless of type, under a primary covered
transaction." Id. § 67.110(a)(1)(ii)(A). Lower tier covered transactions also include pro-
curement contracts between a participant and a person under a primary covered transac-
tion that are at or above the federal procurement small purchase threshold, id.
§ 67.110(a)(ii)(B), and "[any procurement contract... between a participant and a person
under a covered transaction, regardless of amount, under which that person will have a
critical influence on or substantive control over th[e] covered transaction." Id.
§ 67.110(a)(1)(ii)(C). The regulation defines such persons as "[p]rincipal investigators"
and "[p]roviders of federally-required audit services." Id.
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firm cannot enter into transactions at any level with another entity that is
obtaining government grants or other benefits.
Thus, given Executive Order No. 12,68990 and the recent procurement
streamlining legislation' 91 one may ask whether consistency between the
procurement and nonprocurement debarment and suspension rules on
this issue exists and whether the subcontracting and lower tier transaction
rules can be reconciled.92 Certainly, some political and publicity appeal
exists in not allowing federal dollars to flow to any debarred, suspended,
or excluded firms or individuals attempting to do business directly with
the government, or in a subcontract or other lower tier arrangement. In
the procurement arena, however, absent some level of privity between
the government and the affected entity, the prohibition of lower tier sub-
contracting appears punitive in nature. Unless the subcontract requires
government approval (some direct contact between the government and
the affected concern), the party dealing with the government, rather that
the agency itself, should be responsible for the business integrity of any
excluded subcontracting party. Once the government has made a deter-
mination that an eligible firm is responsible and worthy of obtaining a
government contract, no further concern about that firm's lower tier ar-
rangements should remain. At that point, the federal agency has no di-
rect relationship with the tainted party, and arguably the government no
longer needs the same level of protection that it does when privity exists
between the agency and the excluded person or firm.93 If the tainted
party plays an excessive role in the overall operation of the contract or
program, however, the government should exercise its discretion to de-
cline to enter into the prime contract.
By limiting its primary application to prime contracts and most first-
tier subcontracts, the FAR appears to scrutinize more closely situations in
which the government needs protection than does the nonprocurement
approach. Different issues, however, are arguably at stake in the non-
90. See supra note 58 (providing relevant portions of the text of the order).
91. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712, supra note 62, at 102.
92. In another forum the author argued that the 1989 FAR amendments represented a
seemingly unnecessary expansion of the scope of debarments and suspensions. See Shan-
non, supra note 5, at 31-32. The author acknowledges, however, that "given the ongoing
public concerns about procurement fraud, the ban on most subcontracting likely will con-
tinue." hd at 32. Arguably, the same criticism applies to the current nonprocurement
rules, although there may be some significant differences. But see GAO BRIEFING RE-
PORT, supra note 32, at 13 (recommending an extension of the regulations to include all
subcontractors).
93. See 10 U.S.C. § 2408(a) (Supp. V 1993). Even Congress, in barring individuals
convicted of procurement fraud from almost all involvement in defense contracting for at
least five years, generally limited that exclusion to prime defense contracts and first tier
subcontracts. Id.
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procurement arena. For example, differences in the business relation-
ships between the government and private parties often arise depending
on whether the government is procuring goods or services or is involved
in nonprocurement activities, such as a grant, loan, or other benefit pro-
grams. In nonprocurement situations, the pertinent government agency
often may be several levels removed from the actual transactions. Unlike
procurement contract situations, no direct privity "chain" may exist be-
tween the agency and the grantee. Thus, while the government often has
flexibility to require its approval of certain subcontractors in procurement
situations, this safeguard may not be applicable to lower level grantees
under nonprocurement programs. Other policy factors may be at stake
with regard to lower-tier transactions in the nonprocurement arena as
well.94 Thus, it may be appropriate to continue the current exclusion of
debarred and suspended entities from all covered levels of. nonprocure-
ment programs. Additionally, political concerns about allowing any fed-
eral dollars to flow into the hands of a barred entity may inhibit future
intentions to ease restrictions on subcontracting or participation in lower-
tier transactions. As a result, reconciling the different flow-down ap-
proaches in the FAR and the nonprocurement rules may prove to be both
difficult and undesirable.
Because of some of the significant differences between the two sets of
regulations, agency officials currently are approaching the problems of
implementing the Executive Order and the new legislation in another
fashion. An Interagency Coordinating Committee for Suspension and
Debarment has determined that uniformity between the FAR and the
nonprocurement debarment rules is neither desirable nor necessary.
95
Rather than attempting to create one set of uniform regulations, this in-
teragency committee, working with OMB officials and others, recently
has developed proposed regulations to achieve reciprocity. 96 These regu-
lations simply would revise the FAR and the nonprocurement rules to
94. In response to an earlier draft of this Article, several government commentators
stressed that in some federal assistance programs "critical health and safety functions are
often performed" several tiers removed from the primary transaction. Letter from Janet C.
Cook, Assistant General Counsel for Contractor Responsibility, United States Air Force,
to Nancy Miller, Staff Liaison, ACUS 2 (Oct. 17, 1994) (on file with the ACUS) [hereinaf-
ter Cook Letter]; see also Letter from Robert F. Meunier, Director, Suspension and De-
barment Division, & David M. Sims, Chief Hearing Officer, Office of Grants and
Debarment, EPA, to Nancy Miller, Staff Liaison, ACUS 3 (Oct. 14, 1994) (on file with the
ACUS). The government and higher-tier entities may be in a position to provide only
limited oversight in such situations; thus, an expansive scope for any debarment or suspen-
sion may be necessary to assure the exclusion of dishonest or untrustworthy persons at
these lower levels.
95. Cook Letter, supra note 94, at 2.
96. Id at 1-2.
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provide that a debarment or suspension under one set of rules should
have a reciprocal effect in programs governed by the other set of rules. 7
Implementation of these proposed changes should satisfy the mandates of
the earlier executive order and the recent procurement streamlining legis-
lation to ensure that an entity excluded from doing business with one side
of the government's house will be excluded from the other side as well.
Even if reciprocity does not produce the desired consistency, other
steps to achieve greater uniformity through reciprocity exist. For exam-
ple, rulemakers could harmonize the effects that the procurement and
nonprocurement rules give to a proposed debarment. Furthermore, the
addition of a threshold evidentiary showing for a proposed debarment is
another achievable reform.
98
As the integration of procurement and nonprocurement debarment
and suspension procedures continues, another problematic question con-
cerns the determination of which agency should take the lead in pursuing
and handling a case in which an entity has multiple governmental con-
tracts. Interagency cooperation should be a major goal in such situations.
Indeed, the FAR encourages agencies "to establish methods and proce-
dures for coordinating their debarment or suspension actions."' The
nonprocurement regulations include this same language.' Thus, the ba-
sic regulations do not differ here; nonetheless, further implementation
has yet to occur. Although formal policies have not evolved, certain
agencies do endeavor to cooperate and coordinate activities. For exam-
ple, in 1992, the Under Secretary within the Department of Defense is-
sued a policy memorandum addressing interagency coordination.'
97. Id. at 1.
98. Another key difference in the two sets of regulations relates to the FAR's inclusion
of a specific listing of a variety of mitigating factors and remedial measures for the debar-
ring/suspending official to consider when making determinations of responsibility and in-
tegrity. 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-1(a), 9.407-1(b)(2) (1993). Agencies should give attention to
amending the nonprocurement rules to include such factors and measures. For a full dis-
cussion of this topic, see infra notes 286-316 and accompanying text.
99. 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(c) (providing that when multiple agencies have an interest in a
debarment or suspension matter, they shall consider "designating one agency as the lead
agency for making the decision").
100. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.115(c) (1993) (providing similar language to that found in the
FAR).
101. See Memorandum from Don Yockey, Under Secretary of Defense, to the Secretar-
ies of the Military Departments et al. (Sept. 28, 1992) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Yockey Memo]. The Under Secretary did not expand much further beyond the policy that
the FAR already identified. On the other hand, he did recognize the potential for concern
by observing that
[i]t is essential that all debarring officials coordinate fully within the Department
[of Defense] to determine the possible effects of their actions on other organiza-
tions and to receive additional information which may affect their decisions.
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Similarly, the Department of Defense has engaged in efforts with the
EPA to coordinate procurement debarments when defense contractors
violate environmental laws."° One agency official indicated that periodi-
cally debarment officials and staff representatives from interested federal
agencies meet on an informal basis to discuss cases of general interest,
trends, and other items of mutual interest." 3 These informal efforts are a
welcome start, but do not meet the requirement to establish methods and
procedures for coordination of the two sets of regulations. Without addi-
tional development of coordination policies, problems could result." 4
Although this is intended to be effective primarily within [the Department of De-
fense], in certain cases coordination should also be carried out with civilian
agencies.
Id. at 1.
102. See DeVecchio & Engel, supra note 26, at 75-76 (explaining that the cooperation
between the two agencies resulted from "[h]eightened attention to and interest in environ-
mental issues").
103. Interview with Janet Cook, Debarment Official, Department of the Air Force
(May 6, 1994).
104. See, e.g., Facchiano Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 209
(3d Cir.) (involving a HUD debarment action premised on the same underlying wrongdo-
ing as a prior Department of Labor debarment), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 80 (1993);
DeVecchio & Engel, supra note 26, at 66 (describing an EPA case in which the agency
initiated a debarment action despite decisions by two other military agencies not to take
action). In addition, the Chief Administrative Law Judge for HUD observed that his
agency once sought to debar an entity for one year by relying on the same facts that the
Defense Department had used to debar the same concern for two months. Letter from
Alan W. Heifetz, Chief Administrative Law Judge, HUD, to Brian D. Shannon 1 (Apr. 15,
1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Heifetz Letter]. He expressed concern that his
agency had not undertaken efforts to coordinate procedures with other agencies. Id. The
General Counsel for HUD believes, however, that his agency does an adequate job of
coordinating activities with other federal agencies. Letter from Nelson A. Diaz, General
Counsel, HUD, to Brian D. Shannon 2 (Sept. 29, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Diaz Letter]. Mr. Diaz also disputed Judge Heifetz's assertion that HUD attempted to
debar an entity that the Department of Defense previously had debarred. Id. Mr. Diaz
did acknowledge, however, that his agency's Baltimore office did issue "one-year Limited
Denials of Participation" to two companies that the Army previously had suspended and
then debarred. Id.
The Department of Defense uses an informal approach that "essentially gives the lead
agency assignment to the agency with the predominant financial interest." See Yockey
Memo, supra note 101, at 2. This could be problematic when a company traditionally has
contracted or otherwise dealt principally with one department or agency, but has a higher
dollar amount of contracts or other benefit arrangements with another department or
agency in a particular year. Moreover, the wrongdoing giving rise to the action might
involve a contract or grant with yet another department or agency. Overall, the overlap of
procurement and nonprocurement debarments will only expand the potential for problems
and increase the need for coordination. One commentary has suggested that entities facing
potential debarment or suspension should act "proactively to raise the matter with the
agency... most interested in [their] future." DeVecchio & Engel, supra note 26, at 75.
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IV. IMPACT OF KEY COURT DECISIONS ON PROCEDURES
The government-wide debarment and suspension regulations did not
evolve in a regulatory vacuum. Several significant court decisions over
the years have influenced the development of today's procedures. This
section discusses the significance of some key cases.
A. Due Process
1. Government-wide Debarment and Suspension Procedures and
Due Process
Perhaps the most important early case leading to the federal govern-
ment's eventual development of due process standards for government-
wide debarment and suspension procedures is Gonzalez v. Freeman.'
0 5
In Gonzalez, the Commodity Credit Corporation first suspended and
then debarred a contractor from doing business with the agency for five
years.1 6 The contractor asserted that the agency violated its due process
rights. 10 7 In assessing the due process claim, the chief concern of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit was
the lack of agency standards for making debarment determinations.' 08
Accordingly, the court held that the agency's lack of regulations and stan-
dards had resulted in the imposition of a debarment action outside of the
agency's statutory jurisdiction and authority.' 0 9 The court reasoned that
debarment determinations should be made according to established stan-
dards, rather than on a case-by-case basis." 0 Thus, Gonzalez served as a
105. 334 F.2d 570 (D.C. Cir. 1964). The future Chief Justice, Warren Burger, wrote the
Gonzalez opinion. Id. at 571.
106. Id at 572. The agency based its initial suspension of the contractor on allegations
of possible misuse of official inspection certificates. Id The suspension remained in effect
"pending investigation." Id
107. Id at 573. In addressing whether the contractor had a viable due process claim,
the District of Columbia Circuit announced that
to say that there is no "right" to government contracts does not resolve the ques-
tion of justiciability. Of course there is no such right; but that cannot mean that
the government can act arbitrarily, either substantively or procedurally, against a
person or that such person is not entitled to challenge the processes and the evi-
dence before he is officially declared ineligible for government contracts.
Id at 574. The court reasoned further that even though the government's debarment au-
thority is inherent as part of its general statutory contracting power, "to the debarment
power there attaches an obligation to deal with uniform minimum fairness as to all." Id. at
577.
108. Id. at 580. The court stated that the agency had the statutory authority to impose
debarments, but not "without either regulations establishing standards and a procedure
which are both fair and uniform." Id
109. Id.
110. Id at 578. Specifically, the court suggested that basic fairness dictated the estab-
lishment of "standards for debarment and procedures ... includ[ing] notice of specific
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strong impetus for federal agencies to develop debarment and suspension
procedures.11' In that regard, the Gonzalez decision is consistent with
the 1962 Temporary Conference recommendations concerning the need
for greater procedural protection in the administrative debarment and
suspension process.
12
Eight years after Gonzalez, the District of Columbia Circuit addressed
the procedural requirements for government suspension actions in Home
Brothers, Inc. v. Laird."3 In Home Brothers, the court was extremely
critical of the suspension regulations that the Department of Defense had
promulgated at that time." 4 Just as the 1962 Temporary Conference Re-
port described, the regulations allowed suspensions to extend up to eight-
een months or more without an opportunity for confrontation." 5 The
court announced, however, that it would accept temporary suspensions
only for shorter periods, up to one month, without an opportunity for
confrontation." 6 The court reasoned that the government, upon sus-
pending a contractor, should "insure fundamental fairness" by providing
"specific notice" and an "opportunity to rebut [the] charges.""117
The Home Brothers court did not limit its discussion to the suggestion
that the government must offer the suspended contractor some opportu-
nity for confrontation within one month of the suspension. Instead, it
went on to announce its views as to what constituted "'adequate evi-
dence'" for purposes of imposing suspensions and the circumstances in
charges, opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine adverse witnesses, all culmi-
nating in administrative findings and conclusions based upon the record so made." Id.
The court observed, however, that the government could impose temporary suspensions,
with procedures to follow, "for a reasonable period pending investigation." Id at 579.
111. See id at 579. Of course, some agencies had developed procedures prior to Gon-
zalez. See Calamari, supra note 26, at 1145 (explaining that parties were entitled to judi-
cial review if they suffered a wrong resulting from agency actions).
112. See supra notes 6-22 and accompanying text (discussing the recommendations of
the Temporary Conference).
113. 463 F.2d 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In Home Brothers, a contractor asserted that the
Navy had violated the law by issuing a suspension and then refusing to award a ship repair
contract to that contractor some three weeks after the date of suspension. Id. at 1269,
1272.
114. Id at 1269 (explaining that the court believed that serious questions regarding the
fairness of the government's procedures for suspending contractors existed).
115. Id at 1270 (stating that although the court would accept short term suspensions, it
would not accept long term suspensions without the use of fair procedural safeguards for
the contractor).
116. Id. This discussion of the suspension regulations was largely dicta because the
Navy refused to award the repair contract to the suspended contractor only three weeks
after it issued the suspension, well within the one-month window the court found to be
reasonable. Id. at 1272.
117. Id at 1271.
1995]
Catholic University Law Review
which an agency should be permitted to limit notice and hearing opportu-
nities for the contractor."
8
The criteria that the court delineated in Home Brothers eventually be-
came implanted firmly in the government-wide debarment and suspen-
sion regulations. For example, FAR 9.407-3(c)(5) now provides that a
suspended contractor may submit information in opposition to the sus-
pension within thirty days following receipt of the notice of suspension, a
direct incorporation of the one-month period that Home Brothers sug-
gested. 1 9 The FAR also now includes a definition of "adequate evi-
dence" that requires a rather minimal showing similar to that discussed in
Home Brothers.12 °
Another case that influenced the development of due process proce-
dures in the present debarment and suspension regulations is Transco Se-
curity, Inc. v. Freeman.'2' The Transco case also is important in regard to
notice requirements. 122 The contractor in Transco brought a procedural
challenge regarding the suspension regulations that the General Services
Administration (GSA) had adopted subsequent to the District of Colum-
bia Circuit's decision in Home Brothers.23
118. See id at 1271-72 (comparing long term suspensions to preliminary injunctions,
which, after the agency gives notice, are maintainable only upon a showing of adequate
evidence).
119. 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-3(c)(5) (1993). Thus, the drafters of the current debarment and
suspension regulations borrowed liberally from the court's "suggestions." Indeed, many
agencies quickly modified their regulations after the Home Brothers decision. See
Calamari, supra note 26, at 1151; Steadman, supra note 8, at 807-08.
120. Compare 48 C.F.R. § 9.403 (1993) (defining adequate evidence as "information
sufficient to support the reasonable belief that a particular act or omission has occurred")
with Home Brothers, 463 F.2d at 1271 (describing adequate evidence as "less than must be
shown at trial, but . . . more than uncorroborated suspicion or accusation"). In Home
Brothers, the District of Columbia Circuit explained:
The "adequate evidence" showing need not be the kind necessary for a successful
criminal prosecution or a formal debarment. The matter may be likened to the
probable cause necessary for an arrest, a search warrant, or a preliminary hearing.
This is less than must be shown at trial, but it must be more than uncorroborated
suspicion or accusation.
Home Brothers, 463 F.2d at 1271.
121. 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981). Transco involved a chal-
lenge to a GSA suspension of a security guard company. Id. at 319.
122. Id at 324 (explaining that under the circumstances of the case, due process re-
quired notice). In Transco, the suspended contractor challenged both the agency's suspen-
sion regulations and the agency's notice of reasons for the suspension. lId at 320.
123. Id at 321; see supra notes 113-20 (discussing the Home Brothers decision). The
regulations permitted the agency to deny a hearing to the contractor upon advice from the
DOJ that a hearing would adversely affect a criminal prosecution. Transco, 639 F.2d at
320-21. In such a situation, in lieu of a more extensive fact-finding hearing, the contractor
could present only information and arguments in opposition to the suspension. Id at 321-
22. This aspect of the regulations evolved directly from the 1962 Temporary Conference
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The Transco court applied the Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test 24 to
the agency process GSA afforded to the company's challenge to the sus-
pension. 125 Specifically, the court weighed the contractor's liberty inter-
est in avoiding improper denial of the opportunity to seek government
contracts against the dual governmental interests of receiving its con-
tracting "money's worth" and protecting an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion.126 The court denied the contractor's challenge to the regulations
after reasoning that the suspended contractor, even in the absence of a
more detailed hearing on the facts, still had an opportunity to submit in-
formation and argue in opposition to the suspension. 127 Thus, the
Transco decision provided the federal government with a judicial impri-
matur to retain and further develop regulations creating only limited,
post-deprivation process in suspension cases. Despite upholding the pro-
cedural aspects of the GSA regulations, however, the Transco court
nonetheless determined that the agency had provided the contractor with
constitutionally inadequate notice.' 28 The court reasoned that due pro-
cess mandated a specific notice and a "meaningful" opportunity to be
heard.
129
recommendations concerning suspension procedures. The Temporary Conference took the
position that the Justice Department should be able to advise against the holding of a fact-
finding hearing (for up to 18 months) in the event that the agency hearing might prejudice
an ongoing prosecution. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 268, 289
(Recommendation 29-2(b)(1) and related discussion).
124. For a discussion of Mathews, see infra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
125. Transco, 639 F.2d at 322.
126. Id
127. Id. The court also determined that while a high agency official should determine
whether adequate evidence exists for a suspension, the GSA had met the standard because
the decision maker had been the head of the agency. Id. at 324.
128. Id at 323-24. The court found that the GSA had expressed the notice of the con-
tractor's wrongdoing in vague and general terms such as "'billing irregularities.' " Id. at
323.
129. Id. at 324. The Transco court demanded "notice sufficiently specific to enable [the
contractor] to marshal evidence in [its] behalf so as to make the subsequent opportunity
for an administrative hearing a meaningful one." Id. Further, in situations in which the
government claims that it cannot give specific notice because it would prejudice an ongoing
criminal investigation, the court determined that a trial court's proper employment of an in
camera inspection of the evidence should be limited to determining whether the govern-
ment has provided "as specific a notice as is possible under the circumstances." Id. at 325.
Some years later, the Federal Circuit described these notice requirements in a much more
colorful fashion by declaring that the agency's notice must be sufficiently specific to enable
the contractor "to get its 'ducks in a row' in preparation for a meaningful response in the
next step of the administrative suspension process." ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d
677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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2. The Due Process Framework: Mathews and Paul
One of the linchpins of the 1962 Temporary Conference recommenda-
tions was a focus on requiring formal, trial-like hearings as part of the
debarment and suspension process. 3 ° Professor Steadman echoed this
call for greater process in his 1974 study of the debarment and suspension
procedures.' 3 ' As a matter of constitutional due process, these positions
certainly were consistent with the approach of the Supreme Court in
Goldberg v. Kelly.' 32 The perception that due process requires agencies
to make debarment and suspension determinations only after full, trial-
like hearings changed, however, as a result of the Supreme Court's 1976
decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.133 Although not a debarment or suspen-
sion case, Mathews has had a significant impact in shaping subsequent
debarment and suspension law.
In Mathews, the Court set forth an analytical framework for examining
due process challenges to governmental actions that courts continue to
follow.' 34 Mathews involved the question of whether due process re-
quired an oral hearing prior to the government's termination of an indi-
vidual's Social Security disability benefits.' 35 The Supreme Court initially
130. See TEmPoRARY CONFERENcE REPoRT, supra note 9, at 267, 281-84 (Recommen-
dation 29-1(a) and related discussion). It is important to note, however, that even the
Temporary Conference limited its recommendation to the holding of "a trial-type hearing"
only "in the event there are disputed questions of fact relevant to the debarment issue."
Id. at 267 (Recommendation 29-1(a)(ii)). This is because the Temporary Conference rec-
ognized that this type of hearing would be necessary only if the facts were in dispute.
Indeed, the ABA commented that the Temporary Conference had omitted an important
protection for debarment cases when the facts would not be in dispute such as those fol-
lowing civil judgments or when the contractor admitted wrongdoing. Id. at 283 (discussing
the ABA's reaction to the recommendations). Accordingly, rather than demanding an ad-
versarial hearing in such a situation, the ABA suggested the establishment of some oppor-
tunity to demonstrate present responsibility notwithstanding the wrongdoing. Id. The
Temporary Conference agreed that agencies should afford hearings consistent with its rec-
ommendations only in cases involving disputes over the material facts relevant to the de-
barment, and observed further that "in most debarments based on criminal convictions or
civil fraud judgments there would not ordinarily be remaining material issues of fact so that
the debarment could proceed without a trial-type hearing." Id. The report also indicated
that in those types of cases, an additional argument about present responsibility "would be
made to the debarment official." Id
131. See Steadman, supra note 8, at 822-23 (discussing Recommendation 29-1).
132. 397 U.S. 254, 267-68 (1970) (holding that due process requires notice and an op-
portunity to be heard).
133. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). Of course, the earlier reports and recommendations, as well
as the District of Columbia Circuit's decisions in Gonzalez and Home Brothers, preceded
Mathews v. Eldridge.
134. See Jom E. NowAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 531-32 (4th
ed. 1991) (explaining that despite some criticism, the Supreme Court has remained com-
mitted to the balancing approach delineated in Mathews).
135. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 332-49.
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explained that before an action implicates due process protections, the
aggrieved party first must identify a protected property or liberty inter-
est.136 The Court then explained that the reviewing court must be satis-
fied that a property or liberty interest is at stake before it balances three
factors to determine whether due process requires any additional proce-
dures beyond those already in place. 37
Thus, after Mathews, a reviewing court's due process analysis must take
into consideration two distinct inquiries: (1) whether the agency action
implicates a protected property or liberty interest, and (2) if so, whether
any additional procedures are necessary in light of the Mathews three-
pronged balancing test.'3' More importantly, the Mathews Court empha-
sized that when a reviewing court reaches the second part of the inquiry
and applies the balancing test, broad rules are not necessarily controlling
because due process is a matter for a case-by-case determination.
39
Using an analysis similar to the first prong of the Mathews test, the
District of Columbia Circuit, in Gonzalez v. Freeman, effectively estab-
lished that no protected property interest is present when an agency de-
bars or suspends a government contractor.' 4° Despite the lack of a
property interest, however, subsequent lower courts have determined
that an agency's debarment or suspension of a government contractor
triggers due process protections because the action impacts the contrac-
tor's liberty interests.' 4 1 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has never de-
136. 1d at 332. In Mathews, the government agency did not dispute that a protected
property interest was at stake with respect to the disability benefits in question. Id.
137. Id. at 335. The Court listed these three factors as follows:
First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards;
and finally, the Government's interest, including the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re-
quirement would entail.
138. Id at 349 (determining that the agency's post-termination hearing procedures
were constitutionally adequate).
139. Id. at 334. Specifically, the Court stated:
[Past] decisions underscore the truism that "'[d]ue process,' unlike some legal
rules, is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place
and circumstances." "[D]ue process is flexible and calls for such procedural pro-
tections as the particular situation demands."
I& (citations omitted).
140. Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (explaining that there is
no "'right'" to be awarded a government contract). Of course, Gonzalez preceded the
Mathews analysis by more than a decade.
141. See, e.g., ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 683 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (observing
that "although a citizen has no right to a Government contract, and a bidder has no consti-
tutionally protected property interest in such a contract, a bidder does have a liberty inter-
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cided a case specifically involving the constitutionality of debarment and
suspension regulations. Even in Goldberg v. Kelly, 42 the Supreme Court
relied on Gonzalez v. Freeman143 for the proposition that agencies may
terminate government benefits without a pre-termination hearing.144 In
determining that a debarment or suspension implicates a government
contractor's protected liberty interests, however, lower courts have relied
on the Supreme Court's decision in Paul v. Davis'45 and other
decisions.' 46
In Paul v. Davis, the complainant sought damages from a police official
after the police distributed a flyer to local merchants identifying Davis as
an "'active shoplifter.' "147 Although the police previously had arrested
Davis for shoplifting, he never was convicted.' 48 Davis claimed that the
flyer distribution and its wrongful assertion that he was an active shop-
lifter damaged his reputation, created a stigma, and impinged his pro-
est at stake, where the suspension is based on charges of fraud and dishonesty" (footnotes
omitted)); Transco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman, 639 F.2d 318, 321 (6th Cir.) (finding that the
deprivation of the right to bid on a government contract is not a property interest, but a
liberty interest of the bidder "when that denial is based on charges of fraud and dishon-
esty"), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981); Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of
Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 962-63 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (finding a government contractor had a
liberty interest because of the economic impact that governmental defamation would have
on the contractor's ability to do business); Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Air Force,
584 F. Supp. 76, 87 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (finding that when the Air Force suspended a govern-
ment contractor from contracting for fraud and dishonesty, he had a liberty interest). But
see, e.g., Southeast Kansas Community Action Program, Inc. v. Lyng, 758 F. Supp. 1430,
1434-35 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that no liberty interest exists if the government statement
merely alleges incompetence as opposed to dishonesty or some other "badge of infamy"),
aff'd, 967 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1992); PNM Constr., Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 745, 749
(1987) (stating that the agency did not implicate a liberty interest when it found the bidder
nonresponsible because of a lack of competence rather than a lack of integrity). Of course,
even if the government's action implicates a liberty interest, Mathews instructs that the
courts then must apply a balancing test to determine whether the process that the agency
already afforded is sufficient for constitutional purposes. See supra notes 138-39 and ac-
companying text.
142. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
143. See supra notes 105-12 (discussing the Gonzalez decision).
144. Goldberg, 397 U.S. at 263 (stating "that some governmental benefits may be ad-
ministratively terminated without affording the recipient a pre-termination evidentiary
hearing" (emphasis added)).
145. 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Although not a debarment or suspension case, Paul involved
analysis of an alleged infringement of liberty. Id. at 697.
146. See, e.g., Old Dominion Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953,
964-66 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (referring to and explaining both the facts and legal significance of
Paul).
147. Paul, 424 U.S. at 695. Davis sought damages pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Paul,
424 U.S. at 696. The flyer included Davis' name and photograph. Id. at 695.
148. Id. at 696. A local judge dismissed all charges against Davis shortly after city po-
lice circulated the flyer. Id.
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tected liberty interests.149 The Court rejected the constitutional claim
and reasoned that earlier decisions had not established that reputation
alone implicated due process liberty or property interests.' 50
The Paul Court distinguished an earlier case, Wisconsin v. Constan-
tineau,151 in which the Court had found a liberty interest at stake when a
police official caused a notice to be posted in local liquor stores directing
the stores not to make sales or gifts of liquor to the plaintiff for one
year.'52 The Paul Court explained that the stigma resulting from the
posting in Constantineau, standing alone, did not implicate due process in
that case.' 5 3 Instead, the Paul Court emphasized that the governmental
action at issue in Constantineau had not only produced a stigma, but it
also had deprived the affected individual of a right previously held under
state law, the right to buy or obtain liquor.' 54 By contrast, the state ac-
tion in Paul merely was stigmatizing and did not result in any change in
his legal status. Accordingly, the Court denied his liberty interest
claims.' 55 Thus, Paul requires a claimant to demonstrate either a stigma
or damage to reputation plus some change of legal status to establish a
liberty interest claim.'56
It appears that a debarment or suspension generally would satisfy the
stigma-plus test that the Court established in Paul v. Davis. First, in the
usual notice of suspension or proposal for debarment, the government
generally questions the business integrity of the contractor or grantee.' 7
149. Id. at 697. Davis alleged that the stigma and damage to his reputation would seri-
ously impair his future employment opportunities. Id.
150. Id at 701. The Court emphasized "that reputation alone, apart from some more
tangible interests such as employment, is [n]either 'liberty' [nlor 'property' by itself suffi-
cient to invoke the procedural protection of the Due Process Clause." Id
151. 400 U.S. 433 (1971).
152. Id at 435, 437. A state statute allowed such actions with respect to persons known
to have engaged in" 'excessive drinking.'" Id. at 434. Nonetheless, the Court determined
that due process required notice and an opportunity to be heard before the state could post
such material under its liquor laws. Id at 437. The Court reasoned that" '[plosting' under
the Wisconsin Act may to some be merely the mark of illness, to others it is a stigma, an
official branding of a person." Id. The Court declared that "[wlhere a person's good
name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to
him, notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential." Id
153. Paul, 424 U.S. at 709.
154. Id. at 708-09.
155. Id at 712.
156. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsm-uTIONAL LAW 702 (2d ed. 1988).
Professor Tribe observed that contrary to the Court's contentions in Paul, the determina-
tion that due process requires a showing of "stigma-plus" was a considerable departure
from the reasoning in Constantineau and other earlier cases. Id.
157. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2 (1993) (delineating the grounds for debarment); 48 C.F.R.
§ 9.407-2 (1993) (setting out the grounds for suspension); see also 28 C.F.R. §§ 67.305 to
.405 (1993) (showing similar provisions in the common rule for nonprocurement actions).
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Second, the government must place the affected party's name on a list,
which is distributed throughout the government, identifying that party as
ineligible to receive new contract awards or other government benefits, as
the case may be.'15  Finally, a suspension under either the procurement or
nonprocurement regulations or a proposed debarment under the FAR
not only may impugn the affected party's reputation, but also limits that
entity's ability or liberty to seek new contract awards or government ben-
efits, activities that the party previously had been free to pursue.
3. Post-Mathews and Paul Decisions: An Expansion of Due
Process?
As mentioned above, lower courts have determined that a debarment
or suspension affects a contractor's protected liberty interests.'5 9 The
District of Columbia Circuit's decision in Old Dominion Dairy Products,
Inc. v. Secretary of Defense'6° was the first post-Mathews opinion to ex-
pand upon the earlier Gonzalez v. Freeman analysis' 6 ' and to consider
the due process issues in light of both Mathews162 and Paul.63 Although
it was not a legal challenge to an actual debarment,'6 Old Dominion
The regulations also permit debarment based on a history of unsatisfactory performance,
which is a matter of incompetence rather than integrity. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(b)(1); 28
C.F.R. § 67.305(b)(2). Therefore, no liberty interest would be at stake in such a debar-
ment. See Southeast Kansas Community Action Program, Inc. v. Lyng, 758 F. Supp. 1430,
1434-35 (D. Kan. 1991) (finding no liberty interest if the government statement merely
alleges incompetence as opposed to dishonesty or some other "badge of infamy"), aff'd,
967 F.2d 1452 (10th Cir. 1992); PNM Constr., Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 745, 749
(1987) (stating that the agency did not implicate a liberty interest it found the bidder to be
nonresponsible based on a lack of competence rather than a lack of integrity); see also
Coleman Am. Moving Servs., Inc. v. Weinberger, 716 F. Supp. 1405, 1414 (M.D. Ala. 1989)
(finding that the agency did not implicate a liberty interest when it imposed a suspension
based on an indictment because "any stigma that might attach flows not from underlying
charges advanced by the [procuring agency], but from the existence of the indictment
itself").
158. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.500; 48 C.F.R. § 9.404. Proposed debarments, however, do not
have immediate preclusive effect under the nonprocurement rules. See supra notes 73-77
and accompanying text.
159. See supra note 105-29 and accompanying text.
160. 631 F.2d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
161. See supra notes 105-12 (setting forth the Gonzalez analysis).
162. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
163. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
164. See Calamari, supra note 26, at 1155. Old Dominion was not a direct challenge to
an agency debarment or suspension, but involved individual agency refusals to award con-
tracts to Old Dominion based on contract-by-contract determinations of its lack of present
responsibility. Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 962-63. Issues concerning a contractor's present
responsibility (or lack thereof), however, are closely related to the lack of integrity often at
the heart of an agency suspension or debarment. Indeed, successive agency findings of
contractor nonresponsibility based on the same facts and circumstances without notice and
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involved the United States Air Force denial of individual contract awards
to Old Dominion Dairy Products, Inc., based on findings of contractor
nonresponsibility relating to the company's alleged lack of a "satisfactory
record of integrity.' 165 The court determined that the government action
implicated a protected liberty interest. 166 Although the government ar-
gued that the case involved only an injury to the contractor's reputation,
which, according to Paul, is not actionable, 67 the court concluded that
the combined stigma to the contractor and the accompanying loss of gov-
ernment contract work satisfied the Paul stigma-plus test.' 68
an opportunity to be heard can give rise to a successful challenge to the agency actions on
grounds that the practice amounts to a de facto debarment. See, e.g., Shermco Indus., Inc.
v. Secretary of Air Force, 584 F. Supp. 76, 87-94 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (ruling that a defense
contractor's due process rights were not violated by its suspension without a hearing or
notice by the Air Force because the suspension was based on contractor's criminal indict-
ment relating to past performance on government contracts); Art-Metal-USA, Inc. v. Solo-
mon, 473 F. Supp. 1, 4-6 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding that due process requires that the
government must provide procedural safeguards including notice and opportunity to re-
spond, prior to debarring or suspending a contractor); Related Indus., Inc. v. United States,
2 Cl. Ct. 517, 526 (1983) (ruling that a contractor who may be stigmatized by a government
finding that it lacks integrity is entitled to notice and opportunity to respond procedures
under due process clause). The contractor in Old Dominion raised a de facto debarment
argument, but the court did not address the issue directly. See Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at
961 n.17. For a more detailed discussion of Old Dominion, see Lawrence Shire, Recent
Decision, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 90 (1981). The 1962 ACUS Temporary Conference
recommendations raised a concern relating to the problem of de facto debarments. See
TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 269, 291-92 (Recommendation 29-4
and related discussion).
165. Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 958. The contractor challenged the action by claiming
a due process right to be given notice and to have an opportunity to be heard before being
found nonresponsible on lack of integrity grounds. It. at 961.
166. Id. at 966. The contractor did not claim to have any protected property interest.
Id. at 961. Yet, the Old Dominion court observed that, in Gonzalez, then-Judge Burger
had recognized that receiving a government contract was not a property right, but still
determined that the government could not act arbitrarily in causing a contractor to become
ineligible to receive government contracts. See id at 962 (citing Gonzalez v. Freeman, 324
F.2d 570, 574 (D.C. Cir. 1964)). The court then compared the earlier reasoning from Gon-
zalez to the Mathews analysis of whether precluding a contractor from receiving a govern-
ment contract award based on a lack of integrity raises a cognizable liberty interest claim.
Id
167. Id. at 964-65; see supra notes 145-56 (discussing the Paul holding).
168. Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 966. The court also distinguished the facts in Old Do-
minion from the Supreme Court's earlier analysis in Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 573 (1972) (refusing to find a protected liberty interest in a case a where state univer-
sity refused to reemploy a nontenured instructor). The Old Dominion court noted that, in
Roth, the Supreme Court had suggested that the case may have had a different outcome
had the university barred the instructor by virtue of his lack of reemployment from all
other public employment in state universities. Old Dominion, 631 F.2d at 963 (citing Roth,
408 U.S. at 573-74). Similarly, the Old Dominion court reasoned that in the case at bar,
the agency effectively had barred the government contractor from all further public work.
Id
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After Old Dominion, courts have applied the liberty interest analysis
directly to review debarment and suspension challenges. For example,
the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Transco Secur-
ity, Inc. v. Freeman169 relied on Old Dominion for the proposition that a
suspension affects a liberty interest "when that denial is based on charges
of fraud and dishonesty."' 70 Then, in ATL, Inc. v. United States,'7' the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit observed that a
bidder has a liberty interest at stake when charges are based on fraud and
dishonesty; however, a citizen has no right to a government contract, let
alone a property interest in such a contract. 72 Following this analysis,
lower courts have continued to embrace the notion that a debarment or
suspension may impact a government contractor's liberty interests.
Although the Paul analysis provides a foundation for lower court de-
terminations that a debarment or suspension may impact a contractor's
protected liberty interests, the Supreme Court decision in Siegert v. Gil-
ley 1 7 3 calls such analysis into question. In Siegert, the Supreme Court
appeared to retreat from the analysis it had set forth earlier in Paul.
174
Siegert involved a claim for money damages by a government psycholo-
gist, Siegert, who alleged that Gilley, his former supervisor, had violated
Siegert's liberty interests by writing a negative recommendation letter.
175
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of Siegert's claim, holding that
169. 639 F.2d 318 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820 (1981).
170. Id. at 321.
171. 736 F.2d 677 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
172. Id. at 683. The Federal Circuit specifically stated:
[I]n suspension cases it is recognized that, although a citizen has no right to a
Government contract, and a bidder has no constitutionally protected property in-
terest in such a contract, a bidder does have a liberty interest at stake, where the
suspension is based on charges of fraud and dishonesty. Accordingly, the mini-
mum requirements of due process come into play.
IM (footnotes omitted); see also Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Air Force, 584 F.
Supp. 76, 87 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (finding that a government contractor whom the United
States Air Force suspended for fraud and dishonesty had a liberty interest and not a prop-
erty interest).
173. 500 U.S. 226 (1991).
174. See supra notes 145-56 (discussing Paul).
175. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 226-27. Siegert had been a clinical psychologist at a federal
hospital in Washington from 1979 to 1985. Id. at 227. Gilley was Siegert's supervisor dur-
ing Siegert's last several months at the facility. Id. Siegert resigned upon receiving a no-
tice that the government intended to terminate his employment. Id. at 228. Although
Siegert later began working for an Army hospital in Germany, agency "credentialing" re-
quirements forced him to seek a recommendation from Gilley to maintain his job. Id.
Gilley sent the Army a letter declining to recommend Siegert, stating that he viewed " 'Dr.
Siegert to be both inept and unethical, perhaps the least trustworthy individual I have
supervised in my thirteen years [at the federal hospital].' " Id. Not surprisingly, the Army
denied credentials to Siegert based on the letter and subsequently terminated him. Id.
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Siegert had failed to allege a violation of a clearly established constitu-
tional right.
176
The decision in Siegert apparently narrows the Paul stigma-plus test.
Siegert had argued that the combination of the allegedly malicious letter
and the resulting impairment of his ability to retain government employ-
ment satisfied the Paul test. 77 The five-justice majority178 acknowledged
that Gilley's letter "would undoubtedly damage the reputation of one in
his position, and impair his future employment prospects," but it declined
to find that such an injury raised a constitutional claim." 9 Instead, the
Court narrowly interpreted Paul and reasoned that reputational injury
alone was not a liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."8 The Court also observed that Gilley's alleged defamatory state-
ments regarding Siegert were not made incident to the hospital's
termination of Siegert's employment because he wrote the statements
several weeks after Siegert's resignation.'' Accordingly, the Siegert ma-
jority focused its liberty interest analysis on whether the governmental
entity had stigmatized an employee in conjunction with an immediate ter-
mination from employment or a refusal to rehire,8 2 notwithstanding the
employee's allegations that the government's actions obstructed his fu-
ture government employment options. 8 3
176. Id at 231. The Court's basis for dismissal actually differed from the basis that the
lower court rendered, and the parties apparently neither fully briefed nor argued the ques-
tion of whether Siegert properly had asserted the deprivation of a protected liberty inter-
est. Id. at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (reasoning that it was wiser to decide the case by
simply resolving the issue of whether the agency deprived him of a liberty interest); id. at
236-37 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (declaring that the Court must resolve the liberty interest
issue first before deciding the case).
177. Id. at 232.
178. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the five-justice majority. Id. at 227. Justice
Kennedy concurred, in the result, but citing the appellate court's decision regarding the
former supervisor's qualified immunity, he found it "unwise" to reach the constitutional
question without a lower court decision on point and a full briefing and argument before
the Court. Id at 235 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
179. I. at 234.
180. Id at 233. The Court specifically stated that:
injury to reputation by itself was not a "liberty" interest protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment. We pointed out [in Paul] that our reference to a gov-
ernmental employer stigmatizing an employee in Board of Regents of State Col-
leges v. Roth was made in the context of the employer discharging or failing to
rehire a plaintiff who claimed a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Id (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 234.
182. Id at 233-34.
183. See id at 240 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Indeed, Justice Marshall pointed out that
Siegert met Paul's stigma-plus standard "because the injury to Siegert's reputation [also]
caused him to lose the benefit of eligibility for future government employment." Id.
Catholic University Law Review
Consequently, Siegert appears to require a more substantial showing
than Paul's stigma-plus test for identifying a protected liberty interest.'i 4
If the Siegert Court indeed determined that a protected liberty interest is
at stake only when, for example, an immediate governmental discharge
or failure to rehire an employee accompanies stigma, Siegert may affect
the due process analysis in future debarment and suspension chal-
lenges.' Specifically, Siegert alleged that his former supervisor's letter
caused him not to be "'credentialed,' " thereby precluding him from fu-
ture government employment.'8 In comparison, a notice of suspension
or proposed debarment has the similar immediate effect of preventing a
contractor from being eligible to receive new government contract
awards.'" While debarment or suspension usually does not result in the
immediate termination of ongoing government contracts, which would be
something tantamount to a discharge from ongoing employment, a debar-
ment or suspension generally will prevent the award of any future gov-
ernment employment contracts. 18 8 Yet despite Siegert's alleged loss of
future government work due to a government official's stigmatizing ac-
tion, the majority determined that no liberty interest was at stake. 189 Ac-
cordingly, Siegert may cast doubt on lower court opinions that held that a
suspension or debarment implicates a contractor's protected liberty
interests. 9°
184. Id at 232-34.
185. See infra note 190 and accompanying text.
186. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 240.
187. Under the nonprocurement rules, a suspension also has immediate preclusive ef-
fect, but a notice of proposed debarment does not. See 28 C.F.R. §§ 67.312, 67.411 (1993).
188. 48 C.F.R. § 9.405-1(a)-(b) (1993) (explaining that, as a general matter, agencies
may continue existing contracts, but they may not renew or otherwise extend any current
contracts). In contrast, the termination of an existing contract would affect a contractor's
property interests. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1972).
189. Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233-34. Contra id. at 243 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasiz-
ing when the government's stigmatizing charges caused the loss of future government em-
ployment, it implicated the plaintiff's liberty interest). The only aspect of a debarment or
suspension that appears to track the narrow focus that the Siegert Court set forth relates to
the FAR's prohibition against renewing or otherwise extending existing contracts. 48
C.F.R. § 9.405-1(b). In this respect, a debarment or suspension would be akin to the lan-
guage in Siegert where the government's failure to "rehire" an employee, when coupled
with a damage to his reputation, amounts to the potential deprivation of a liberty interest.
See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 233.
190. See Siegert, 500 U.S. at 243 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority
opinion was inconsistent with the District of Columbia Circuit's frequent espousal of the
view that the government deprives a person "of a protected liberty interest when stigma-
tizing charges 'effectively foreclos[e] [his or her] freedom to take advantage of other Gov-
ernment employment opportunities'" (alteration in original) (quoting Old Dominion
Dairy Prods., Inc. v. Secretary of Defense, 631 F.2d 953, 964 (D.C. Cir. 1980))). But see
Reeve Aleutian Airways, Inc. v. United States, 982 F.2d 594, 598 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting
that, in a case arising after Siegert, the government did "not deny that some process [was]
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Even assuming that the lower courts' finding that a liberty interest is at
stake in a debarment or suspension action remains good law, Mathews v.
Eldridge9' requires the analysis of what additional process is due.192
Courts that have considered constitutional challenges to debarment and
suspension regulations and their failure to require pre-deprivation hear-
ings, generally have upheld the validity of the regulations as applied to
various agency actions.' 93
due because Reeve [had] a liberty interest in avoiding the damage to its reputation and
business caused by a stigmatizing suspension").
191. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
192. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text (discussing the Mathews decision).
193. See, e.g., James A. Merritt & Sons v. Marsh, 791 F.2d 328, 330-31 (4th Cir. 1986)
(upholding the suspension of a contractor from bidding on government contracts because
of an indictment for fraud); Electro-Methods, Inc. v. United States, 728 F.2d 1471, 1476
(Fed. Cir. 1984) (affirming the suspension of a contractor and denying the contractor's due
process claims because the contractor could not "subpoena and examine FBI agents in-
volved in an on-going criminal investigation, as well as other Government and industry
officials, to prove its case"); Textor v. Cheney, 757 F. Supp. 51, 59 (D.D.C. 1991) (uphold-
ing bidder's debarment based on procedures set forth in FAR, 48 C.F.R. 9.406-3(b));
Mainelli v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 606, 613-14 (D.R.I. 1985) (allowing the United
States Department of Transportation's suspension of a contractor based on an indictment
and departmental investigations); Shermco Indus., Inc. v. Secretary of Air Force, 584 F.
Supp. 76, 87-90 (N.D. Tex. 1984) (stating the Air Force did not violate a contractor's due
process rights for suspending the contractor based on a "criminal indictment against [the
contractor] and 'additional information' supporting that indictment before [the agency]
recommended suspension"); see also Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230,
247-48 (1988) (unanimously upholding an FDIC suspension of an indicted bank president
even though applicable banking statutes did not provide for any pre-suspension hearing);
Robinson v. Cheney, 876 F.2d 152, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that the standard for a
debarment based on a " 'cause of so serious or compelling a nature that it affects the pres-
ent responsibility'" of the contractor is not unconstitutionally vague as applied) (quoting
48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(c)); GAO BRIEFING REPORT, supra note 32, at 10 (concluding that
"the current [debarment and suspension] process maintains an appropriate balance be-
tween protecting the government's interests in its contractual relationships, and providing
contractors with due process"); ABA PAcrrA=ONER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at 153 (ob-
serving that "only an exceptional suspension or debarment decision will likely contain a
constitutional or procedural flaw meriting court review"); cf ATL, Inc. v. United States,
736 F.2d 677, 683, 686 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (upholding the procedures as applied but invalidat-
ing the agency's action, in part, with respect to notice issues); Iansco Sec., Inc. v. Freeman,
639 F.2d 318, 322-24 (6th Cir.) (upholding the hearing procedures that the agency used, but
reversing the suspension based on insufficient notice of charges), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 820
(1981).
In contrast, contractors have enjoyed somewhat greater success challenging debarments
and suspensions in cases in which an agency either did not follow the regulations or other-
wise acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner subject to reversal under the APA. 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (D) (1988); see, e.g., Novicki v. Cook, 946 F.2d 938, 942-43 (D.C. Cir.
1991) (invalidating an agency decision to debar a corporation's president based on a find-
ing that the agency record was insufficient to show that the official had" 'reason to know' "
of misconduct by other corporate officials); Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 399-401 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (finding an agency's decision to debar only select few of the corporate officials in
a convicted corporation to be arbitrary and capricious); Silverman v. United States Dep't
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B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Although the Supreme Court seldom has considered cases involving
debarment or suspension actions, the Court recently had the opportunity
to consider a legal question arising in the context of a challenge to a
HUD debarment in Darby v. Cisneros.194 The issue at stake, however,
involved the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies.' 95 In Darby, a HUD administrative law judge debarred a real
estate developer and several affiliates for violating an agency mortgage
insurance rule.1 96 Under HUD regulations, either an administrative law
judge or a judge from the HUD Board of Contract Appeals conducts the
debarment proceedings in an administrative hearing." 7 The administra-
tive law judge's decision to debar a participant or contractor after an ad-
ministrative hearing is final unless the participant or contractor submits a
written request for review of the decision to the Secretary or the Secre-
tary's designee within fifteen days of receipt of the decision. 98
In Darby, the debarred real estate developers immediately filed suit
challenging the administrative law judge's determination rather than
seeking internal agency review as the regulation authorized.'99 The
agency moved to dismiss the complaint on the grounds that the challeng-
of Defense, 817 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D. Cal. 1993) (finding that the agency abused its
discretion in not considering mitigating factors when it debarred a contractor who had
been convicted of misdemeanor conversion); Sterlingwear of Boston, Inc. v. United States,
11 Cl. Ct. 879, 885 (1987) (determining that the debarring agency violated the regulations
by making a decision not to hold a fact-finding proceeding before the contractor submitted
its information in opposition to the proposed debarment). But see Shane Meat Co. v.
United States Dep't of Defense, 800 F.2d 334, 336-38 (3d Cir. 1986) (overturning the trial
court's determination that a three-year debarment was arbitrary and capricious); Mikulec
v. Department of Air Force, No. 84-2248, slip op. (D.D.C. June 27, 1985) (holding that it
was not arbitrary and capricious for an agency to suspend a corporation based on the cor-
porate president's arson indictment for acts allegedly occurring some years earlier).
194. 113 S. Ct. 2539 (1993).
195. Id. at 2543-45.
196. Id. at 2541.
197. 24 C.F.R. § 26.2 (1994). The current HUD procedures are more formal than those
of most agencies. See id. § 24.313.
198. Id. § 24.314(c). The regulations address the finality of an administrative law
judges's decision as follows:
[The] determination shall be final unless.., the Secretary or the Secretary's des-
ignee, within 30 days of receipt of a request decides as a matter of discretion to
review the finding of the [administrative law judge]. The 30 day period for decid-
ing whether to review a determination may be extended upon written notice of
such extension by the Secretary or his designee. Any party may request such a
review in writing within 15 days of receipt of the [administrative law judge's]
determination.
Id.
199. Darby, 113 S. Ct. at 2542.
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ers had failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies by declin-
ing to appeal the administrative law judge's decision within the agency.
200
The Court examined whether the APA requires disgruntled parties to
exhaust administrative remedies when no statute or agency regulation
specifically mandates exhaustion.20 1 By construing the relevant provi-
sions of the APA, the Court ultimately determined that the statute does
not require exhaustion in such a case.2" In reaching this result, the Court
examined section 10(c) of the APA concerning "actions reviewable.s
2°3
The Court applied a plain meaning analysis to this portion of the APA
and determined that in cases in which the APA governs "an appeal to
'superior agency authority' is a prerequisite to judicial review only when
expressly required by statute or... an agency rule.,,2°  Accordingly, be-
cause no statute or HUD rule expressly required the debarred parties in
Darby to appeal within the agency, they could bypass the agency appeal
and proceed directly to judicial review.
Despite Darby's implications, it seems unlikely that Darby will have a
major impact on the debarment and suspension process. Indeed, as of
this writing HUD has not yet revised its debarment regulations concern-
ing internal appeals. Clearly, the agency could alter its debarment provi-
sions to require parties to direct their appeals from administrative law
judge decisions to the Secretary or to a designated debarment official.205
200. Id The district court denied the motion by relying on one of the traditional excep-
tions to the exhaustion doctrine: that resort to the administrative remedy would have been
inadequate and futile. Id. The Fourth Circuit reversed, reasoning that no evidence to sug-
gest that an administrative appeal would have been futile existed. Id.
201. Id at 2543.
202. Id. The debarred challengers had sought judicial review of the HUD determina-
tion pursuant to the APA on the basis that the agency allegedly "imposed [the debarments]
for purposes of punishment, in violation of HUD's own debarment regulations, and there-
fore were 'not in accordance with law' within the meaning of § 10(e)(B)(1) of the APA, 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)." Id. at 2542.
203. 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988). In particular, the case turned on the Court's interpretation
of the last sentence of section 10(c), which provides:
Except as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or
determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsidera-
tions, or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that the action
meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency authority.
Id. (emphasis added).
204. Darby, 113 S. Ct. at 2548. In one portion of the opinion, the Court detailed how
the legislative history provided support for their plain meaning analysis. Id. at 2545-48.
205. See ABA PacrroNER's GumE, supra note 4, at 103. The agency apparently
intends to change its regulations to mandate internal exhaustion. Id. On the other hand,
HUD may revise its current procedures altogether. See infra note 247. Despite HUD's
inaction, other agencies are amending internal appeals rules in response to this decision.
See, e.g., 59 Fed. Reg. 23,119, 23,119-20 (1994) (to be codified at 10 C.F.R. pt. 12) (reflect-
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On the other hand, the agency might not want to require appeals in all
cases as a prerequisite to judicial review.20 6 Even if the regulations re-
main unchanged, in some cases the aggrieved parties still might choose to
pursue appeals within the agency in the hope of obtaining a more
favorable ruling.2"7
Outside of HUD, the Darby decision Should not have a great impact
on the debarment and suspension process because HUD's procedures are
more formal than those of most agencies. In many agencies, an adminis-
trative law judge will not serve as the agency official issuing the debar-
ment or suspension decision. Rather, high agency officials will make
these determinations, often without the regulatory prospect of internal
agency appeals.
V. DEGREES OF FORMALITY
Over the years, commentators have attacked the constitutionality and
desirability of debarment and suspension regulations, particularly with re-
ing that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission implemented the Equal Access to Justice Act
partly in response to Darby).
206. Cf Kisser v. Cisneros, 14 F.3d 615, 618 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (noting that the Secretary
designee reversed the administrative law judge's decision, but went on to impose a suspen-
sion in an arbitrary and capricious manner). In Kisser, HUD first suspended, then debar-
red, a former officer of a HUD coinsured lender in separate and independent enforcement
proceedings. Id. at 617-18. Kisser successfully challenged both actions in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. But on appeal, the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the agency's debarment while HUD
did not appeal the trial court's vacating of the initial suspension. Id. at 618, 623. With
respect to the vacated suspension, even though the agency administrative law judge (ALU)
had ordered the agency to lift the suspension following a hearing, the HUD Secretary's
designee nonetheless ordered the agency to reinstate the suspension upon an internal ap-
peal by the agency. Id. at 617. The district court ruled that the reinstated suspension "was
arbitrary and capricious because the Secretary's designee, on reviewing the AU, had ig-
nored the record before her; asserted her conclusions without evidentiary support; and also
violated the relevant regulations, by putting the burden of proof on Kisser to show that he
should not be suspended." Id. at 618 (emphasis added).
207. One administrative law scholar has been extremely critical of the Darby decision.
See Bernard Schwartz, "Apotheosis of Mediocrity"? The Rehnquist Court and Administra-
tive Law, 46 ADMIN. L. REv. 141, 160-62 (1994). Professor Schwartz has suggested that the
Court's decision was contrary to the "elementary exhaustion doctrine" and eviscerated
compelling reasons for exhaustion such as "administrative autonomy" and "sound judicial
administration." Id. at 161-62. Professor Schwartz also has warned that Darby will result
in ."a proliferation of [internal] appeals from AU decisions by agencies themselves" be-
cause losing parties can go directly to court under Darby. Id. at 162. This, in turn, would
cause "the ALI's [to become] the final arbiters-making it difficult for the agency heads to
ensure conformity with their policies in the agency decision process." Id. Although
outside the general scope of this report, both the Darby decision and Professor Schwartz's
analysis suggest that further research may be warranted regarding whether Congress
should amend the APA to permit courts to employ the exhaustion doctrine more broadly
in APA cases.
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spect to the provisions for post-deprivation hearings.20 8 In view of the
many judicial decisions upholding the process, however, arguments that
due process requires additional procedures within the debarment and sus-
pension regulations are largely unfounded. Given the significant govern-
mental interests at stake, even though a debarment or suspension may
implicate some modicum of protected liberty, adequate notice combined
with the post-deprivation process set forth in the regulations generally
will provide the affected entity with a constitutionally sufficient opportu-
nity to respond to the charge. Even if the current procedures comport
with constitutional mandates, however, minimal due process require-
ments generally represent a floor rather than a ceiling, which reformu-
lates the question of whether additional procedures should be added.
Over the years, the ABA's Public Contract Law Section has been ac-
tively engaged in seeking greater process for contractors facing debar-
ment or suspension. For example, at roughly the same time that the
OFPP developed government-wide debarment and suspension proce-
dures, the ABA adopted certain "principles" relating to debarment and
suspension that would have afforded contractors far more process than
that set forth in the OFPP policy letters.2" As another means to provide
more protection, Congressman Sam Hall introduced a bill in 1984 that
would have created a government-wide board staffed by administrative
law judges to handle procurement debarments and suspensions.2 ° The
bill was based largely on a series of measures that the ABA's House of
Delegates recommended in 1982,211 and it would have gone far beyond
208. See, e.g., Calamari, supra note 26, at 1169-74 (acknowledging the constitutionality
of the hearing procedures but recommending that agencies use administrative law judges
and more formal hearings); Coburn, supra note 26, at 576 (acknowledging that contractors
should have a debarment or suspension hearing so they can confront and comprehend the
evidence against them); Norton, supra note 26, at 652 (questioning the validity of the lack
of pre-suspension hearing opportunities); Duvall, supra note 26, at 711-13 (criticizing pro-
cedures not including standards for agencies to assess "public interest"); Patrick J.
DeSouza, Note, Regulating Fraud in Military Procurement: A Legal Process Model, 95
YALE L.J. 390, 407 (1985) (recommending pre-suspension and pre-debarment hearings to
allow "courts to assume a more active role in addressing fraud"); Everhart, supra note 26,
at 756-66 (criticizing the GSA's suspension of a contractor without due process).
209. See Coburn, supra note 26, at 577-79 (asserting that the ABA principles provide
broader due process protection for contractors through application of the Mathews fac-
tors); Graham, supra note 26, at 236-37 (noting that the ABA guidelines arose in response
to the perceived lack of due process protections for contractors during the suspension and
debarment process).
210. See Rep. Hall Introduces Bill to Create Gov't-Wide Debarment/Suspension Board,
41 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 240, 240 (Feb. 13, 1984).
211. Id.
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the OFPP efforts. The proposed legislation died, however, in
committee.212
Congressman Hall's bill, House Bill 4798, would have created an in-
dependent "Debarment and Suspension Board" comprised of at least
three administrative law judges to consider all procurement debarment
and suspension cases. 213 The bill would have limited the imposition of
debarment only upon a showing of "a substantial and continuing risk that
the person [would] not substantially perform all of the material, legal and
contractual obligations and requirements" of federal contracts or the ob-
taining of government contracts.214 Moreover, the bill called for hearings
before the "super board" with a requirement that the government prove
the grounds for debarment upon a showing of clear and convincing
evidence.215
In a similar context, the bill would have permitted suspensions only
when a strong likelihood that a debarment would follow and upon a
showing of exceptional circumstances. 216 The bill also would have re-
quired a hearing prior to any suspension unless the initiating agency
could demonstrate, by affidavit, the likelihood of "immediate and irrepa-
rable injury, loss, or damage." '217 Clearly, House Bill 4798 would have
changed the debarment and suspension process substantially and would
have created a judicialized forum for consideration of these matters. The
bill never gained momentum, however, and consequently, the ABA's ef-
forts to establish a single government-wide board replete with trial-like
proceedings generally came to an end as well.218
212. See Friedman, supra note 26, at 308 (noting that "[t]he bill was referred to the
Committee on the Judiciary, but was not acted upon in the 98th Congress").
213. See H.R. 4798, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. § 201, at 24-25 (1985).
214. Id § 102(a), at 4.
215. Id. at' 6.
216. Id at 5. The bill would have limited suspensions to 60 days, but would have al-
lowed extensions upon the initiating agency's showing of further exceptional circum-
stances. Id.
217. Id. at 12.
218. See Cox, supra note 26, at 437 n.79 (observing that "no hearings were ever held, no
co-sponsors were ever obtained, and the bill died at the end of the 98th Congress"). A few
years later the ABA Section on Public Contract Law somewhat more narrowly called for a
single board within the Department of Defense to handle all debarment and suspension
cases for that agency. Letter from James J. Myers, Section Chairman, ABA Section of
Public Contract Law, to the Honorable David Packard, Chairman, President's Blue Rib-
bon Commission on Defense Management (Jan. 24, 1986), reprinted in THE FAR SYSTEM:
ITS CRITICAL FORMATIVE YEARS 1984-1986, at C-71.1, -71.3 (1988) [hereinafter Myers
Letter]. Even as it called for a single Defense Department board to decide these matters,
the proposal recommended that the appropriate procuring agencies retain responsibility
for initiating all debarment and suspension actions. Id.
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Little interest appears to exist in considering further the creation of a
single board to hear all government debarment and suspension cases. In
response to inquiries posed to various agency officials and private coun-
sel, both groups generally were opposed to the creation of a single gov-
ernment-wide board. Several agency officials stressed that debarment
and suspension determinations are primarily the business decisions of the
affected agencies. Accordingly, it would be cumbersome to divorce the
administrative decision-making process from an agency's business judg-
ment.219 Others oppose a centralized system because of their concern
that such a board could become unduly formal and bureaucratic.22° Cor-
porate counsel for a large defense contractor also objected to a single-
government board on comparable grounds. He reasoned that because
the law charges procuring agency's contracting officers with making de-
terminations of responsibility prior to the award of contracts, the agency
also should have a stake in making global decisions about present respon-
sibility through debarment or suspension actions.22' In contrast, one gov-
In 1991, one more brief effort to consolidate the debarment and suspension responsibili-
ties in the Department of Defense arose. See H.R. 2521, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 8110, at
103 (1991). The 1992 Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, which the House of
Representatives passed on June 7, 1991, included a provision that no funds could "be used
to pay the salaries of debarment/suspension officials [within the Department of Defense]
unless such personnel [were] assigned to a consolidated office of Debarment and Suspen-
sion within the Office of the Inspector General." Id. The final bill excluded this ill-con-
ceived plan. The House of Representatives apparently considered creating a single
debarment and suspension authority for the agency because the House Appropriations
Committee was troubled that at least one Defense agency had been too aggressive in im-
posing the suspension remedy. See H.R. REP. No. 95, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 238 (1991).
There was some degree of irony in the bill's choice of the Department's Office of Inspector
General as the proposed debarment and suspension authority given that office's long-
standing aggressive attitude toward the liberal imposition of debarment and suspension
against government contractors. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, RE-
PORT ON SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT AcrivrrY wrrHIN THE AIR FORCE 11-13 (1988);
OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEP'T OF DEFENSE, REVIEw OF SUSPENSION AND DEBAR-
MENT AcrvrrmEs wITHIN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 45, 49-50, 74-75 (1984) (listing
examples of problems with a liberal imposition of debarments and suspensions against gov-
ernment contractors). For further criticism of this proposal, see Shannon, supra note 5, at
33-43.
219. Many of the persons who responded asked that I would not directly attribute their
comments to them. I am honoring their requests through respect for their stated wishes
and in appreciation for their candor. I have retained their letters on file.
220. As a result, a more rigid structure would be less responsive to both the particular
needs of various agencies and to new developments. Furthermore, processing delays could
pose a problem. A more formalized system also could be detrimental to a smaller business
in terms of the resources that might be necessary to participate in the forum.
221. Correspondingly, the agency debarring official should have sufficient expertise
concerning the agency's standards and practices to assist in making objective and fair
decisions.
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ernment contracts attorney in private practice commented that a single
large board would enhance consistency and rationality.
222
Several reasons explain why neither the agencies nor many private
counsel support the idea of one "super board" to handle all debarment
and suspension matters for the federal government. First, such an entity
would enlist a body of decision makers with no direct involvement in the
business decisions of the various agencies. Second, the board could be
cumbersome and have limited flexibility. It also is questionable whether
the change would produce any cost savings, particularly given the initiat-
ing agencies still would need to be involved in the process and numerous
officials would likely be necessary to staff the board. Finally, the imple-
mentation of government-wide regulations already has helped achieve
greater uniformity and has reduced the disparity in treatment.
Counsel for various contractors subject to debarment actions also have
endeavored to generate procedural change by judicially challenging
pending debarments and suspensions rather than using the regulatory
process. In addition to the due process challenges addressed above,
22 3
other cases during the last few years have involved contractors who assert
that certain aspects of the APA's formal adjudicatory procedures should
apply to debarment and suspension matters. For example, in Leitman v.
McAusland,224 the contractors challenged their three-year debarments
from purchasing surplus personal property from the federal govern-
ment.225 As one of their grounds for challenging the Defense Logistics
Agency's (DLA) debarment decision, the contractors contended that a
DLA official had violated section 554(d) of the APA "by acting as both
prosecutor and debarring official at the hearing. '226 The contractors
urged that the DLA agency official who had presided as the hearing of-
222. Similarly, but on a narrower scale, the report by the 1962 ACUS Tbmporary Con-
ference review committee called for a single board or independent examiner for the entire
Defense Department to "achieve greater uniformity of decision." TEMPORARY CONFER-
ENcE REPORT, supra note 9, at 283. On the other hand, the corporate counsel who pro-
vided comments in opposition to a single board expressed the view that the employment of
a "super board" would lead to a lack of reality in decision making. Several members of the
Debarment and Suspension Committee of the ABA's Public Contract Law Section also
opposed the idea of a single board and favored maintaining an ability to deal with agencies
with which contractors may be most familiar. Interview with Richard Bednar, Chair, &
Various Members, Debarment & Suspension Committee, ABA Public Contracts Section,
in Washington, D.C. (May 6, 1994).
223. See supra notes 105-93 and accompanying text.
224. 934 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1991).
225. I at 47-48.
226. Id at 49. The contractors also urged, inter alia, that the DLA agency official pre-
siding over the debarment hearing had initiated improper ex parte contacts. Id. The court
rejected this latter claim. Id. at 50.
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ficer in the debarment proceedings improperly had assumed the role of
prosecuting officer at the hearing by questioning the witnesses. 227 De-
spite acknowledging that the parties had raised a "thorny issue" regard-
ing whether the APA's formal adjudicative procedures applied to
debarment proceedings, the court avoided deciding the question.' In-
stead, the court simply assumed that the APA's provisions for formal ad-
judication applied to the case and decided that the agency had not
violated the APA's limits on combining prosecutorial and decision-mak-
ing functions. 229 The court reasoned that merely because the official con-
ducting the hearing posed questions to some of the witnesses, he had not
placed himself in the position of prosecutor.230 Thus, even if the debar-
red contractors could have established a constitutional basis for applying
the APA's formal adjudicatory procedures to the debarment process,
their claims still would have failed.
The United States Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit has addressed
more directly whether any of the APA's formal adjudicative procedures
apply to the debarment and suspension process. In Girard v. Klopfen-
stein,231 two contractors challenged their debarments by urging that the
agency's procedures were invalid because they did not require an admin-
istrative law judge to preside over the debarment proceedings.232 In de-
termining that the APA did not apply to the case, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that because no statute required that a debarment proceeding
receive an evidentiary hearing, then no enabling legislation existed to re-
quire an "on the record" proceeding for purposes of section 554(a) of the
227. Id at 48-49. A different employee represented the agency at the hearing and
served as the prosecuting official. Id. at 49.
228. Id at 44. The court correctly observed that no statute required debarment pro-
ceedings to be "on the record" for purposes of section 554(a) of the APA, but also ob-
served that "a judicial gloss has found that these provisions [of the APA] also apply to
certain hearings required by the Constitution, rather than a statute." Id
229. Id
230. See id The court analogized the agency official's questions to those that a trial
judge generally is allowed to ask and observed that most of the questions were attempts to
clarify matters or to move the proceedings along. Id
231. 930 F.2d 738 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 173 (1991). In Klopfenstein, the
Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) debarred two contractors for
improperly selling cheese that was ineligible for a particular government cheese-buying
program. Id at 739.
232. Id If an agency enabling statute requires a matter to be resolved "on the record,"
thereby triggering formal adjudication under section 554(a) of the APA, then one of the
elements of the formal adjudicative proceeding is the opportunity for a hearing before an
administrative law judge. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554(c)(2), 556, 557 (1988).
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APA.2 33 Accordingly, the court concluded that the express terms of the
APA do not require the presence of an administrative law judge in a de-
barment proceeding.2"
The debarred contractors also attacked the constitutionality of the de-
barment regulations by claiming that they lacked a guarantee that a con-
tractor facing debarment would have an unbiased decision maker
presiding over a fair hearing.2 35 The debarred contractors argued that the
Supreme Court's holding in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath236 mandated
that administrative law judges must conduct agency debarment proceed-
ings.237 The Klopfenstein court, however, determined that Wong Yang
Sung was inapplicable to the debarment proceedings in question.238 The
Klopfenstein court reasoned that, unlike the regulations in Wong Yang
Sung, which required the hearing officer to engage in investigative,
prosecutorial, and adjudicative duties in deportation proceedings, the de-
barment regulations at bar did not require the debarring officer to inves-
tigate on behalf of the agency.239 Moreover, the regulations at issue did
not expressly combine the roles of prosecutor and decision maker.24 ° The
233. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d at 741. The court relied on Gonzalez v. Freeman, 334 F.2d
570, 576 (D.C. Cir. 1964), for the proposition that debarment is not a creature of statute,
but part of the inherent authority of contracting agencies. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d at 741.
234. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d at 742. In contrast, administrative law judges from HUD
believe that the law should be changed to make debarment and suspension actions subject
to the formal adjudication requirements of the APA. Heifetz, Letter, supra note 104, at 2.
HUD debarment proceedings already are conducted in front of an administrative law
judge or a judge from that agency's Board of Contract Appeals. See 24 C.F.R. § 24.313
(1993); infra note 247 and accompanying text (discussing HUD's procedures in more de-
tail). Most officials involved in the process from other agencies, however, neither prefer
that level of formality nor favor a change to require debarment matters to be conducted on
the record for purposes of the APA's rules for formal adjudication.
235. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d at 742. The contractors asserted that the regulations did not
provide sufficient procedural safeguards "to protect [their] property and liberty interests
against unwarranted infringement." Id. (alteration in original).
236. 339 U.S. 33 (1950). In Wong Yang Sung, United States Immigration Service regu-
lations required that members of the agency's investigative branch conduct the agency's
deportation hearings. Id. at 45. In addition, the regulations charged the hearing officer
who presided over the case to interrogate both the person to be deported and his wit-
nesses. Id. at 46. Thus, the decision maker in a deportation case served as both an investi-
gator for the agency and a prosecutor during the proceedings. Although no statute
required the agency to provide any kind of hearing, due process required one. Id. at 49-50.
With respect to the type of hearing required, the Supreme Court held that the APA provi-
sions should apply. I& at 51. Specifically, the Court determined that notwithstanding the
lack of any statutory language triggering the formal adjudicative aspects of the APA, Con-
gress intended the words "required by statute" set forth in section 554(a) of the APA to
cover hearings required by either statute or constitutional due process, Id. at 50.
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court concluded that the FAR's debarment procedures had "comport[ed]
with the fundamental fairness requirements of due process" under the
Mathews v. Eldridge balancing test' 1 and consequently, "the rationale of
Wong Yang Sung ha[d] no application to the . . debarment
regulations.
24 2
VI. VARIATIONS ON UNIFORMITY
Notwithstanding the promulgation of government-wide debarment and
suspension regulations, some lack of uniformity remains among agencies
regarding the implementation and application of the procedures. For ex-
ample, the military departments and other agencies within the Depart-
ment of Defense allow affected contractors to present the decision maker
with information and arguments in opposition to a suspension or pro-
posed debarment in an informal setting.243 If the information in opposi-
tion to the proposed action raises a genuine dispute over the facts, the
agency will proceed to a somewhat more formal fact-finding hearing.2'
The GSA also follows informal procedures similar to those within the
Department of Defense.245 In contrast, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) has more formal regulations that require petitioners to
argue cases before hearing officers, who subsequently make recommen-
dations to the debarring official.2"6 At the extreme, HUD provides even
241. See supra notes 133-39 and accompanying text.
242. Klopfenstein, 930 F.2d at 743. The court concluded that fundamental fairness
"guarantees a fair hearing before an impartial trier of fact to persons facing ... debarment
proceedings." Id. The court also found that the impartial party need not be an administra-
tive law judge as the APA contemplated. Id. at 742; see ARTHUR E. BONFIELD &
MICHAEL AsIMow, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 114 (1989) (discussing
the Court's holding in Wong Yang Sung, but questioning whether Wong Yang Sung is con-
sistent with today's more "variable" due process determinations given the Supreme
Court's decision in Mathews v. Eldridge).
243. See 59 Fed. Reg. 27,662, 27,700-01 (1994) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. ch. 209, app.
H-103). The agency's new hearing procedure describes the in-person presentation as "an
informal meeting, nonadversarial in nature." Id. at 27,701 (app. H-103(b)). The proceed-
ing appears to resemble a conference more than a hearing.
244. Id. (app. H-104). Although more adversarial, the fact-finding proceeding is not
subject to the Federal Rules of Evidence or the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id (app.
H-104(d)). The Defense Department's fact-finding procedures are described in more de-
tail below. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
245. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 509.406-3, 509.407-3 (1993) (requiring an oral presentation before
a hearing officer but not a transcript).
246. See David M. Sims, Suspension and Debarment Potent Government Tools, 25
SONREEL NEWS (ABA Sec. of Nat. Resources, Energy and Envtl. Law), JanJFeb. 1994,
at 1, 14 (Mr. Sims is the Chief Hearing Officer for the agency); see also ABA PRACrI.
TIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 92-93 (observing that the EPA conducts hearings before
hearing officers even in cases in which no material facts in dispute exist).
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more formal procedures." 7 Furthermore, despite the presence of a basic
framework of uniformity, a great deal of variation also exists between
agencies with respect to the officials employed to serve as debarring or
suspending officials." 8 On the other hand, notwithstanding some differ-
ences in the nature of these individuals' job positions, they all tend to be
high agency officials.249
Whether greater uniformity should be a goal is a debatable question.
Although formerly more disparate, the major procuring agencies within
the Department of Defense2 "° have endeavored to achieve greater uni-
formity in their debarment and suspension practices over the last several
247. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 26.1 to .25 (1993). The recent ABA monograph described the
HUD procedures as "markedly different" from those of any other agency. ABA PRAcrn-
TIONER'S GUIDE, supra note 4, at 96. The agency has relatively formal rules of procedure.
HUD requires hearings before members of the agency's Board of Contract Appeals or
other agency administrative law judges whose decisions are final unless the agency or af-
fected person pursues discretionary internal appeal. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 24.313, 24.314(c).
For a discussion of constitutional issues that have arisen in light of this discretionary re-
view, see supra notes 194-207 and accompanying text.
It is interesting to note that of all the agency officials who responded to the author's
request for comments, only administrative law judges from within HUD sought the adop-
tion of more formal procedures. Heifetz Letter, supra note 104, at 2. The HUD adminis-
trative law judges adopted the view that the law should require "on the record"
proceedings for debarments and suspensions, thereby triggering formal adjudication under
the APA. See 5 U.S.C. § 554(a) (1988). Of course, this recommendation comes as no
surprise given that administrative law judges may feel more comfortable with trial-like
procedures. The General Counsel of HUD, however, has indicated that his agency may
revise its suspension and debarment regulations to make HUD's process more comparable
to other federal agencies. Diaz Letter, supra note 104, at 2-3.
248. See ABA PRAcrrriONER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at app. F (listing the debarment/
suspension officials for federal agencies).
249. See id Due process may require a decision by a high-level administrator anyway.
See, e.g., ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736 F.2d 677, 687 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (indicating that a
four-star admiral clearly suffices). The regulations also do not define who should act as the
agency's presiding official during a contractor's presentation of information and arguments
in opposition to the action. Cf 24 C.F.R. § 300.1 to .13 (1993). In most agencies, however,
the contractor can make a presentation to the debarring/suspending official in an in-person
meeting. See ABA PRACnMONER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at 80. Nevertheless, other issues
arise regarding the designation of an agency's decision maker that may require further
scrutiny. Should, for example, a debarring official charged with carrying out procurement
debarments under the FAR also serve in the chain of command for the agency's procure-
ment decisions? The Air Force recently answered this question by replacing the Deputy
Assistant Secretary for Acquisition with a newly created Assistant General Counsel posi-
tion as its debarring official. See 59 Fed. Reg. 27,622, 27,668-69 (1994) (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. § 209.403(1)). The agency made this decision, in part, to move the debarment/sus-
pension power out of the direct chain of procurement decision making. Yet, such a dual
role appears acceptable if one views a debarment or suspension decision strictly as one of
many procurement or grant-making determinations that an agency regularly makes.
Although unlikely to reach the level of a due process concern, issues of basic fairness may
mandate some level of separation of these functions.
250. These include the Air Force, Army, Navy, and DLA.
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years. For example, the Air Force and Navy had processed debarment
and suspension cases through review boards comprised primarily of pro-
curement officials who would then make recommendations for action to a
higher official in each agency.25' In an effort to emulate the procedures
of the Army and the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), the Air Force and
Navy have eliminated their boards and have installed debarring officials
in high-level legal positions.252 Additionally, in early 1992 the Under
Secretary of Defense issued guidelines to encourage the defense agencies
to follow more uniform procedures in their debarment and suspension
activities.253 Consistent with these 1992 guidelines, the Department of
Defense recently added an appendix to the agency's FAR (DFARS) sup-
plement setting forth uniform procedures for all of its debarring and sus-
pending officials.254 This new appendix generally addresses notice
251. See Memorandum from Anthony H. Gamboa, Deputy General Counsel (Acquisi-
tion) of the Army, to the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) (Nov. 18, 1991), re-
printed in 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 417-18 (Mar. 9, 1992) [hereinafter Gamboa Memo]
(finding that, generally, the procedures were fairly uniform, but some differences in the
approaches of the three military branches and the DLA did exist).
252. l at 418-19. Now, the Navy's General Counsel serves as the debarring official,
see 48 C.F.R. § 209.403(1) (1993), and in the Air Force, the Assistant General Counsel for
Contractor Responsibility is the debarring official. See 59 Fed. Reg. at 27,668-69. Having
a single official solely responsible for considering debarment and suspension matters may
have advantages over the previous board structure. As a former counsel to the Air Force
Debarment and Suspension Review Board (from 1983 to 1986), the author can attest to the
scheduling difficulties that often arose. With a board comprised of two senior procurement
officials and a senior procurement attorney (all of whom had many different responsibili-
ties), scheduling delays regularly occurred while the board attempted to process cases or
conduct meetings or hearings with affected contractors. In addition to enhanced efficiency,
the changes should make the services' debarring officials more accessible to affected
contractors.
253. See Yockey Approves Guidelines for Uniform Suspension and Debarment Proce-
dures, 57 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 377, 377 (Mar. 9, 1992) (discussing guidelines to provide
more consistency between the agency's various debarment and suspension authorities).
254. See 59 Fed. Reg. app. H, at 27,700-01 (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. ch. 2, app. H).
Appendix H also would apply to the array of other debarring and suspending officials in
assorted defense agencies and overseas military commands in addition to those for the Air
Force, Army, Navy and DLA. See id app. H-100, at 27,700 (stating that the "appendix
provides uniform debarment and suspension procedures to be followed by all debarring
and suspending officials").
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requirements 255 and procedures for conducting fact-finding hearings. 256
Although it calls for somewhat less formal procedures, this DFARS ap-
pendix sets forth a process generally consistent with the 1962 ACUS Tem-
porary Conference recommendations.257
255. Id. at 27,700-01. Section H-101 provides that, in general, "[a] copy of the record
which formed the basis for the decision by the debarring and suspending official will be
made available to the contractor." Id. app. H-101, at 27,700-01. Furthermore, if the
agency withholds a portion of the record, it must inform the contractor "of what [was]
withheld and the reasons for such withholding." Id at 27,701. Prior to this regulation, the
agencies had provided different types of information to contractors as part of a notice of
action. See Gamboa Memo, supra note 251, at 418; see also ATL, Inc. v. United States, 736
F.2d 677, 684-85 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (contrasting the Navy's conduct in providing a suspended
contractor with only portions of the record serving as the basis for the suspension with that
of the Air Force in an earlier case in which the Air Force had provided a suspended con-
tractor with all of the evidence available at the time of the suspension).
256. See 59 Fed. Reg. app. H-104, at 27,701. The FAR requires a fact-finding hearing to
be held in any case in which a contractor's submission of information and argument in
opposition to a proposed debarment raises a genuine dispute over material facts. See 48
C.F.R. § 9.406-3(b)(2) (1993) (limiting this section's scope to debarments not based on a
conviction or civil judgment). Similarly, assuming the contractor's initial submission in
opposition generates a factual dispute, the FAR generally calls for a fact-finding hearing in
suspension cases that are not premised on an indictment. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-3(b)(2).
Additionally, in a suspension case the agency may defer to the DOJ's advice to forego a
hearing if substantial government interests involving pending or future "legal proceedings
based on the same facts as the suspension would be prejudiced." Id. Other than provi-
sions listing a few basic hearing requirements, such as the right to appear with counsel,
submit documents, present witnesses, confront any person the agency might present, and
receive a transcribed record, the FAR does not provide much information regarding these
fact-finding hearings. See id. § 9.406-3(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (for debarments); id § 9.407-3(b)(2)(i)-
(ii) (for suspensions). Instead, the FAR instructs agencies to establish the necessary proce-
dures "as informal as is practicable, consistent with principles of fundamental fairness." Id.
§ 9.406-3(b) (for debarments); id. § 9.407-3(b) (for suspensions).
Although the various defense agencies previously had procedures in place for fact-find-
ing proceedings, Appendix H represents an effort to create uniformity within the agency.
Under the new rules, the debarring and suspending official will designate a fact-finder to
conduct a hearing upon determining that a genuine dispute over material facts exists (in
debarment cases not involving convictions or civil judgments and suspension cases not
based on indictments). 59 Fed. Reg. app. H-104(a), at 27,701. The designated fact-finder
will then conduct a hearing and generate written findings of fact by a preponderance of the
evidence. Id. app. H-106(b), at 27,101. Finally, the debarring and suspending official will
use these findings to make a decision regarding whether to impose a debarment or con-
tinue a suspension. Id. app. H-106(b)-(c), at 27,101.
257. The Temporary Conference recommended that affected parties be afforded "a
trial-type hearing before an impartial agency board or hearing examiner in the event there
are disputed questions of fact relevant to the debarment issue." TEMPORARY CONFER-
ENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 267 (Recommendations 29-1(a)). The FAR and imple-
menting regulations such as Appendix H echo the Temporary Conference's call for
conducting separate fact-finding hearings only in those cases in which there are genuine
issues of material fact. In addition, Appendix H requires an independent fact-finder. 59
Fed. Reg. app. H-104, at 27,701. The Temporary Conference, however, contemplated a
more formal hearing consistent with the requirements for formal adjudication under the
APA. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 281. For example, the
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Before addressing the question of whether all government agencies
should pursue further efforts, like those of the Department of Defense, to
make debarment and suspension procedures more uniform, one should
note that implementing procedures may vary in degree from one agency
to another. This variation does not necessarily make one agency's pro-
gram more fair or responsive than others. From a constitutional perspec-
tive, the Mathews v. Eldridge analysis258 requires consideration of due
process challenges on a case-by-case basis.259 Indeed, courts largely have
upheld constitutional challenges to the procedures that Department of
Defense agencies follow, 2 ° which are perhaps as informal as any agency
procedures. Due process does not require more formal procedures, and
existing regulations allow agencies flexibility to develop and employ pro-
cedures to meet their own respective needs. Hence, it appears that fur-
ther uniformity generally is not required.26'
Despite the lack of a general need for greater uniformity, one addi-
tional topic is pertinent with regard to the nature of the decision makers
involved in the process. The pertinent regulations for debarment and sus-
pension contemplate two basic types of in-person hearings between an
provisions for formal adjudication under the APA place strict limits on ex parte contacts.
See 5 U.S.C. § 557(d) (1988). In contrast, Appendix H does not mention the potential
problem of ex parte contacts. Yet, despite its relative informality, Appendix H does pro-
vide procedures that are far more trial-like than the FAR procedures for debarment and
suspension concerning matters without disputed facts. Indeed, Appendix H should pro-
vide a fair framework for resolving disputed facts in those cases in which it applies.
Appendix H also differs from the Temporary Conference Report with regard to section
H-106's limitation on the fact-finder to determine only disputed facts, thus leaving the
ultimate decision to debar or maintain a suspension in the discretion of the debarring offi-
cial. 59 Fed. Reg. app. H-106(6)-(c), at 27,701. Conversely, the Temporary Conference
Report concluded, "we think one who decides should hear." TEMPORARY CONFERENCE
REPORT, supra note 9, at 283. By leaving the ultimate decision regarding whether to con-
tinue a pending action to the discretion of a single high-level official, however, the limita-
tion on the fact-finder under Appendix H appears sensible because of the potential for
greater consistency in decision making.
258. See supra notes 133-39 (discussing Mathews).
259. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (describing due process as flexible
and not subject to fixed rules).
260. See supra note 193.
261. One scenario, however, is worth noting. If an entity has contracts or grants with
multiple agencies and faces a possible debarment or suspension action, the decision as to
which agency will pursue the matter is likely to be significant to that entity. The affected
entity probably will seek to be subject to the jurisdiction of an agency that affords the
greatest procedural protections or, alternatively, to be before an agency that is more flexi-
ble and less formal. Of course, the affected entity may not have any control over the
outcome of this matter. On the other hand, these considerations may encourage the entity
to take the initiative in approaching a more favorable forum before one of the interested
agencies commences action. See DeVecchio & Engel, supra note 26, at 75.
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agency and an affected concern.262 In the procurement arena, for exam-
ple, an affected contractor has the opportunity to make an in-person pres-
entation to the agency within thirty days following receipt of the notice of
action for either a suspension or a proposed debarment.263 If the agency
premises its action on an indictment (for a suspension) or a conviction or
civil judgment (for a proposed debarment), the regulations do not pro-
vide for any further hearing procedures.' Similarly, if the contractor's
submission of information in opposition to the action does not raise any
material dispute over the facts, no further hearing procedures are war-
ranted.265 Hence, a contractor is entitled to a further fact-finding pro-
ceeding only when the initial presentation raises a genuine dispute over
the facts.
266
The regulations, however, do not identify the type of official who
should preside over a fact-finding hearing. Consequently, it would seem
reasonable for the federal government to amend the regulations to iden-
tify which official(s) should preside over such fact-finding proceedings.267
In confronting this issue, the ACUS previously has suggested that admin-
istrative law judges should hear cases involving "imposition of sanctions
with substantial economic effect." 2' That same standard also may be ap-
262. 48 C.F.R. 9.407-3(c)(5) (1993).
263. 1&t § 9.406-3(c)(4).
264. Id. §§ 9.406-3(b)(2), 9.407-3(b)(2).
265. Id. §§ 9.406-3(b)(2), 9.407-3(c)(5)-(6).
266. In the case of a suspension, the DOJ may advise the agency that additional pro-
ceedings would jeopardize pending or contemplated criminal or civil proceedings. Id.
§ 9.407-3(c)(6). This could block further fact-finding proceedings even though there might
be a genuine factual dispute. Md.
267. This assumes that the designated fact-finder is someone other than the debarring
and suspending official. Even the new DFARS appendix, which delineates the rules for
conducting such fact-finding hearings, does not identify the type of official who will serve
as the adjudicator. See 59 Fed. Reg. 27,662, app. H-104, at 27,701 (to be codified at 48
C.F.R. app. H-104); see also supra notes 254-57 and accompanying text (comparing the
DFARS appendix to the recommendations set forth by the ACUS Temporary Confer-
ence). Sensibly, Appendix H-104 also limits the designated fact-finder to determining the
facts in dispute while the debarring and suspending official retains sole jurisdiction to de-
termine ultimately whether the facts support a basis to continue the action. 59 Fed. Reg. at
app. H-106(b)-(c), at 27,701.
Some agencies have designated fact-finders under their own rules. For example, the
Department of Energy's subpart to the FAR designates a three-member panel to conduct
any fact-finding conferences. See 10 C.F.R. § 1035.8(a) (1994). The EPA uses hearing of-
ficers for both initial proceedings and fact-finding hearings. See ABA PRAcrrmroNR'S
GUIE, supra note 4, at 92. The Department of Agriculture has an additional twist be-
cause its regulations permit a debarred or suspended entity to appeal that determination to
the agency's Office of Administrative Law Judges for review. See 7 C.F.R. § 3017.515
(1994).
268. 1 ACUS, ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES RECOMMENDA-
TIONS AND REPORTS 38 (1992).
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propriate with respect to actual fact-finding proceedings under the debar-
ment and suspension rules.269
VII. PERIOD OF DEBARMENT
FAR 9.406-4(a) broadly provides that a debarment "shall be for a pe-
riod commensurate with the seriousness of the cause(s). '2 70 The regula-
tion further states that, in general, a debarment "should not exceed 3
years."' 271 A contractor also is entitled to receive credit for any period of
suspension that precedes a debarment.272
The three-year period originated from ACUS Recommendation 29-8
as part of the 1962 Temporary Conference proceedings and recommenda-
269. Although the regulations do not address this point directly, the problem may be
more theoretical than real. Very few debarment or suspension cases actually involve dis-
putes over material facts. Indictments or convictions that, under the regulations, do not
require an additional hearing on the facts serve as the basis for the majority of cases. Even
in those cases in which the agency has developed the factual basis for proceeding, very few
actions have resulted in fact-finding hearings. For example, in fiscal year 1994, indictments
served as the basis for 96% of the Air Force's suspensions. See Cook Letter, supra note 94,
at 4. Additionally, in the five-year period between 1989 and 1994, NASA processed 11
cases (involving 38 parties) all of which were based on indictments or convictions. Facsim-
ile Transmission from Thomas J. Whelan, NASA Procurement Policy Division, to Brian D.
Shannon (Sept. 14, 1994) (on file with author). On the other hand, although a majority of
the Army's 851 suspensions and debarments between fiscal year 1992 and 1993 were based
on indictments or convictions, the Army also used evidence that it developed on its own to
impose over 300 debarments during those two years. Facsimile Transmission from Lt. Col.
Thomas W. Rau, Procurement Fraud Division, Department of the Army, to Brian D.
Shannon (Sept. 13, 1994) (on file with author). Nevertheless, among the 300 evidentiary
debarments, none of contractors' presentations of information in opposition to the pro-
posed action generated any dispute over the material facts. Similarly, in 1993, of the total
449 debarments and suspensions that the DLA imposed, 356 were based on convictions or
indictments. Facsimile Transmission from Cherie Taylor, Office of the General Counsel,
DLA, to Brian D. Shannon (Sept. 14, 1994) (on file with author). Yet, the agency con-
ducted no fact-finding proceedings in the other cases. Id Even HUD, where the current
procedures are more formal than in other agencies, has indicated that indictments or con-
victions serve as the basis in 59% of its cases (beginning in 1990). Letter from Georjan D.
Overman, Trial Attorney, Office of General Counsel, HUD, to Brian D. Shannon (Oct. 6,
1994) (on file with author). Finally, the EPA uses hearing officers for both initial proceed-
ings and fact-finding hearings and has conducted approximately six to ten fact-finding
hearings per year over the last several years. Telephone Interview with Robert F. Meunier,
Director, Suspension & Debarment Division, EPA (Sept. 16, 1994).
270. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(a) (1993).
271. Id The subsection does provide an exception to the three-year limit for violations
of "the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 ... [which] may be for a period not to exceed 5
years." Id (citation omitted). The nonprocurement regulations similarly require that de-
barments generally should not exceed three years. See 24 C.F.R. § 24.320(a)(1) (1994)
(HUD); 28 C.F.R. § 67.320(a)(1) (1994) (DOJ).
272. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(a).
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tions.27 Prior to that time, the military departments generally pursued
five-year debarments for fraud and other convictions. 274 The Temporary
Conference recommended three years primarily because it was the maxi-
mum period Congress had employed for several statutory debarments
and because it was the period that most contracting agencies used at that
time.275 Balancing "notions of fairness" and "the public interest" in max-
imizing government contracts competition, the Temporary Conference's
review committee concluded that after a reasonable debarment period,
which should not exceed three years, agencies should give contractors a
second chance.276
Although three years currently is the presumptive period, the regula-
tions are flexible and allow shorter or longer debarments depending on
the severity of the contractor's actions.277 The debarring official can ex-
tend a debarment for an additional period if it "is necessary to protect the
Government's interest. '278 An agency, however, cannot extend a debar-
273. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 293-94. Recommenda-
tion 29-8 provided that "except as provided by statute or executive order, debarments
should be for a reasonable, definitely stated period of time commensurate with the serious-
ness of the cause therefor, but not to exceed three years." Id. FAR 9.406-4(a) and the
parallel provision in the nonprocurement rules closely mirror the language contained in
this recommendation. See supra notes 270-71 and accompanying text.
274. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 279-80, 294. The report
observed that the five-year military debarments "at times appear[ed] to be motivated by
punitive considerations." Id. at 294. The Defense Supply Agency even had sought to im-
pose indefinite debarment periods in certain cases (with periodic reconsideration). Id
275. Id
276. Id
277. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(a) (1993). The nonprocurement regulations afford the debar-
ring officials similar flexibility. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.320(a) (1994).
278. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(b) (1993); cf. Facchiano Constr. Co. v. United States Dep't of
Labor, 987 F.2d 206, 212-13 (3d Cir.) (holding that res judicata did not preclude present
DOJ debarment proceedings against a contractor for violations of labor standard, even
though HUD previously debarred the contractor), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 80 (1993). In
Facchiano Construction, the Department of Labor (DOL) debarred the company and cer-
tain individuals for three years throughout the federal government "for willful and aggra-
vated violations of Davis-Bacon Related Acts." Id. at 213. The company challenged the
debarment because HUD previously had debarred the contractor from participation in
HUD programs for 18 months based on the same underlying conduct. Id. at 209. It argued
that res judicata principles precluded the DOL from pursuing the government-wide debar-
ment given the prior 18-month debarment from HUD programs. Id. at 211. Although
HUD now has the authority to issue debarments with government-wide effect, see 24
C.F.R. § 24.200(a) (1994), the court rejected the company's arguments, reasoning that
HUD did not have the authority to bar the company on a government-wide basis at the
time in question. Facchiano, 987 F.2d at 211-12. The court also determined that although
the underlying wrongful conduct that had been the subject of the HUD proceeding was at
issue in the DOL case, "the two debarment proceedings arose from different statutes and
different evidence." Id. at 212-13.
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ment based solely on the same facts and circumstances that formed the
basis of the initial debarment.279
Conversely, an agency also has the flexibility to reduce the period or
extent of a debarment." ° Indeed, the ACUS Temporary Conference rec-
onmendations in 1962 suggested "that debarments should be removed
upon a showing of current responsibility. '28 1 Therefore, if a contractor
no longer lacks present responsibility, there may not be a need for a full
three-year debarment. To that end, the FAR allows the debarring official
to reduce a debarment if the contractor demonstrates a basis for doing
279. Facchiano, 987 F.2d at 212-13; cf. Wellham v. Cheney, 934 F.2d 305, 309 (11th Cir.
1991) (holding as a matter of law that a later conviction for matters giving rise to an initial
debarment constitutes "a new fact or circumstance" under FAR 9.406-4(b), thereby sup-
porting an extension of that debarment). In Weliham, the court strained to reason that
because a conviction for fraud or false statements is a separate and distinct cause for debar-
ment, an agency could consider the fact of the conviction as a new fact or circumstance
justifying an extension of the debarment period. Wellham, 934 F.2d at 309. Although a bit
dubious and reluctant, the court acknowledged that while "the accuracy of the DLA's con-
clusions are debatable .... they are clearly not arbitrary or capricious." Id at 310 n.3.
As a general proposition, if an agency debars a company for three years based on con-
tracting improprieties that bear on the present responsibility of the firm, and then extends
the debarment based solely on a conviction arising out of the exact same wrongdoing, the
agency's conduct would appear to be highly punitive in nature. In fairness to the agency in
Wellham, however, the extension of the debarment was for only one additional year and
was not based solely on the eventual conviction. Id. at 308-09. Instead, the agency ex-
tended the debarment, in part, because the contractor had submitted false certificates of
conformance in connection with two contracts that had not been the subject of the initial
debarment. Id. The court reasoned that "[wihatever the precise meaning of [FAR] 9.406-
4(b), the DLA certainly acted reasonably in finding that" the improprieties concerning the
two additional contracts were not the same facts or circumstances underlying the initial
debarment. Id. at 309.
Another issue concerning the duration of a contractor's exclusion from government pro-
grams arises under HUD's regulations. HUD has authorized certain lower level agency
officials to impose suspension-like "limited denial[s] of participation" that result in exclu-
sions from specific HUD programs within a defined area for up to one year. See 24 C.F.R.
§ 24.700 to .713 (1994). These agency officials can impose a limited denial of participation
for some of the same reasons that could constitute grounds for debarment. See id.
§ 24.705. Furthermore, the regulations state that "[t]he imposition of a limited denial of
participation shall not affect the right" of the agency to take subsequent suspension or
debarment action. Id § 24.710(b). Moreover, nothing in the regulations indicates that a
later debarment action should take into account the duration of any such limited denial of
participation. The Chief Administrative Law Judge for HUD has questioned the fairness
of this process. See Heifetz Letter, supra note 104, at 2. Although the scope of a limited
denial of participation is much narrower than that of a suspension or debarment, the regu-
lations appear duplicative and could result in cumulative exclusions (at least in some pro-
grams) for longer than the presumptive three-year period.
280. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(c).
281. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 294. The rationale for
this part of the recommendation was that "[i]f new facts develop which show the original
judgment was incorrect when made or is without continuing validity, there is probably no
authority to continue the debarment." Id.
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SO.2 2 In addition to limiting the duration of a debarment, the debarring
official also can narrow the extent of a debarment to particular divisions,
organizational elements, or products.3
While the pertinent regulations create a presumptive three-year limit
on debarments, debarring officials may impose longer initial debarments
when the facts warrant such action.' Of course, the danger exists that if
the debarment period exceeds three years, the agency may have crossed
282. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(c). That section allows a contractor to provide "reasons such
as-(1) Newly discovered material evidence; (2) Reversal of the conviction or civil judg-
ment upon which the debarment was based; (3) Bona fide change in ownership or manage-
ment; (4) Elimination of other causes for which the debarment was imposed; or (5) Other
reasons the debarring official deems appropriate." Id.; see also 28 C.F.R. § 67.320(c)
(1994) (containing the nonprocurement version). A contractor also could attempt to have
the debarring official lift or limit a debarment by demonstrating satisfactory achievement
of certain mitigating factors or remedial measures identified in FAR 9.406-1(a) even if
those steps were not in place at the time of the initial debarment determination. 48 C.F.R.
§§ 9.406-1(a), 9.406-4(c).
283. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(b); see also 28 C.F.R. § 67.325(a) (1994) (stating the scope of
nonprocurement debarment). The imputation of liability from individuals to corporations
and vice versa and the extension of a debarment or suspension to affiliated persons or
businesses also have produced litigation relating to the scope of extent of debarments and
suspensions. The FAR regulations define "affiliates" in terms of direct or indirect control
and provides that "[b]usiness concerns, organizations, or individuals are affiliates of each
other if, directly or indirectly, (a) either one controls or has the power to control the other,
or (b) a third party controls or has the power to control both." 48 C.F.R. § 9.403 (1993).
The nonprocurement regulations contain similar language. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.105(b)
(1994). Both sets of regulations include certain indicia of control such as "interlocking
management or ownership, identity of interests among family members, [and] shared facili-
ties and equipment." Id (listing these and other indicia of control). Consequently, agen-
cies must provide separate notices to any affiliate subject to action. See, e.g., 48 C.F.R.
§ 9.406-1(b). But the agencies also may impute the wrongdoing of employees to corporate
entities and vice versa. See id § 9.406-5 (setting forth standards for imputing "fraudulent,
criminal, or other seriously improper conduct").
The inclusion of standards for affiliate status and imputation of responsibility is respon-
sive to concerns that the 1962 Temporary Conference raised. See TEMPORARY CONFER-
ENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 279 (expressing concern that the regulations failed to
specify criteria for determining affiliate status and when to extend debarments to affili-
ates). Nonetheless, litigation continues to arise concerning the scope and breadth of these
regulatory standards for affiliation and imputation. See, e.g., Novicki v. Cook, 946 F.2d
938, 942-43 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (invalidating an agency decision to debar a corporation's pres-
ident upon finding that the agency record was insufficient to show that the president had
"'reason to know' " of misconduct by other corporate officials); Robinson v. Cheney, 876
F.2d 152, 160-61 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding a debarment of a corporation despite the
individual wrongdoer's transfer of certain ownership interests to a trust because the indi-
vidual maintained some level of control); Caiola v. Carroll, 851 F.2d 395, 396 (D.C. Cir.
1988) (holding that an agency's decision to debar certain corporate officials of a convicted
corporation and not others was arbitrary and capricious). The litigation primarily relates
to the contours of the existing regulations, however. The present standards, as construed
by the courts, provide a workable framework for addressing these matters.
284. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(a) (providing that debarments generally should not exceed
three years); see also 28 C.F.R. § 67.320 (a)(1) (providing same, but adding that agencies
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the line from trying to protect the government to administering punish-
ment. Nonetheless, debarments in excess of three years are not un-
known.28 5 To avoid arbitrary application of the debarment weapon and
the perception that agencies are employing the sanction in a punitive
manner, agencies should be very hesitant to go beyond the three-year
period unless the case is exceptional. To do otherwise would mock the
requirement that agencies refrain from using debarment as punishment.
VIII. MITIGATING FAcrORS
The debarment regulations in the FAR are permissive and not
mandatory. The debarment official has discretion to impose a debarment
and may debar a contractor for any cause set forth in the regulations.2 6
may impose a longer period for nonprocurement debarments "[w]here circumstances
warrant").
285. See, e.g., Coccia v. Defense Logistics Agency, No. 89-6544, 1992 WL 345106 (E.D.
Pa. Nov. 12, 1992). In Coccia, the court declined to overturn a 15-year debarment
although it originally had set aside the agency's debarment order based on a lack of sup-
port in the administrative record to justify the length of the debarment. Id at *1. The
court initially had remanded the case to the agency for a more detailed explanation of its
rationale for imposing the 15-year debarment. Id at *2. On remand, the agency reaf-
firmed its earlier decision to debar for 15 years, concluding that Coccia had corrupted the
"system for a ten year period by interfering with the confidentiality of the bid process and
giving secret price information to the contractors who bribed him." Id at *4. In addition,
Coccia, who apparently did not understand or appreciate the impact his conduct had on
the procurement system, instead blamed the system for his wrongdoing. Id Indeed, even
the court found Coccia's corruption of the system to be "reprehensible," id. at *6, and
"characterized by repeated abuse of the Government procurement system which spanned a
period of at least ten (10) years up until the time" of detection. Id at *5. Accordingly, the
court found the agency's decision to debar for 15 years to be rational and "based on rele-
vant factors." Id. at *6.
In her debarring decision, the debarring official had recognized that "'[a]lthough a de-
barment generally is imposed for three years, there is no maximum period. The Govern-
ment thus is free to impose longer periods in egregious circumstances that present an
unusual threat to the Government's business interests. This is such a case.'" Id at *5.
The facts in Coccia reveal that the situation leading to the lengthy debarment in that case
was exceptional. To avoid eviscerating the three-year standard, however, agencies should
endeavor not to allow exceptions to encompass the rule. Obviously, even Mr. Coccia can
take advantage of the FAR to present additional facts or new mitigating factors and reme-
dial measures during the term of his debarment in an effort to have the debarment period
shortened. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-4(c).
286. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a). The FAR specifically provides that "[tihe existence of a
cause for debarment.., does not necessarily require that the contractor be debarred; the
seriousness of the contractor's acts or omissions and any remedial measures or mitigating
factors should be considered in making any debarment decision." Id The suspension reg-
ulations contain similar language. See id § 9.407-1(b)(2). One attorney who responded to
my request for comments identified the lack of criteria addressing when an agency should,
or should not, suspend medium to large corporations based on potential violations of the
law by employees as his "most pressing area of concern." Letter from Marshall J. Doke,
Jr., to Brian D. Shannon 1 (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with author) [hereinafter Doke Letter].
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This aspect of the FAR is consistent with the general policy that agencies
should impose debarments and suspensions only to protect the govern-
ment's interests and not as punishment.287 Mitigating factors and reme-
dial measures are highly pertinent to ensure that such actions fall within
this policy. Accordingly, the FAR now requires that debarring officials
should consider relevant mitigating factors and remedial measures, and
since 1992, it even lists ten such factors.2m In contrast to the FAR, the
rules for nonprocurement debarments require debarring officials to take
mitigating factors into account, but do not include a comparable list of
287. 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (1993); see also Roemer v. Hoffmann, 419 F. Supp. 130, 131-
32 (D.D.C. 1976) (observing that, notwithstanding a conviction, an agency should consider
mitigating factors concerning present business risks).
288. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-1(a)(1) to (10). The listed factors include the following:
(1) Whether the contractor had effective standards of conduct and internal
control systems in place at the time of the activity which constitutes cause for
debarment or had adopted such procedures prior to any Government investiga-
tion of the activity cited as a cause for debarment.
(2) Whether the contractor brought the activity cited as a cause for debarment
to the attention of the appropriate Government agency in a timely manner.
(3) Whether the contractor has fully investigated the circumstances surround-
ing the cause for debarment and, if so, made the result of the investigation avail-
able to the debarring official.
(4) Whether the contractor cooperated fully with Government agencies during
the investigation and any court or administrative action.
(5) Whether the contractor has paid or has agreed to pay all criminal, civil, and
administrative liability for the improper activity, including any investigative or
administrative costs incurred by the Government, and has made or agreed to
make full restitution.
(6) Whether the contractor has taken appropriate disciplinary action against
the individuals responsible for the activity which constitutes cause for debarment.
(7) Whether the contractor has implemented or agreed to implement remedial
measures, including any identified by the Government.
(8) Whether the contractor has instituted or agreed to institute new or revised
review and control procedures and ethics training programs.
(9) Whether the contractor has had adequate time to eliminate the circum-
stances within the contractor's organization that led to the cause for debarment.
(10) Whether the contractor's management recognizes and understands the se-
riousness of the misconduct giving rise to the cause for debarment and has imple-
mented programs to prevent recurrence.
Id The ten mitigating factors became effective in early 1992. See 56 Fed. Reg. 67,129,
67,129-30 (1991). Furthermore, although debarring officials must consider these factors,
"[t]he existence or nonexistence of any mitigating factors or remedial measures... is not
necessarily determinative of a contractor's present responsibility." Id at 67,130. The con-
tractor also has the burden of disproving the need for debarment "to the satisfaction of the
debarring official." Id.
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factors.289 An agency's failure to consider pertinent mitigating factors or
remedial measures could be grounds for a successful judicial challenge. 29
The mitigating factors described in the procurement debarment rules
have had an intriguing evolution over the last decade. The development
began in 1984 when then-Deputy Secretary of Defense Taft ordered in-
terim changes to the agency's DFARS to require generally that contrac-
tors be debarred for more than a year in the case of any felony
conviction.291 In addition, these "Taft" rules provided that the agency
could use mitigating factors only to determine the length of the debar-
ment period. 29 These changes in the rules provoked much criticism,2 93
which prompted the Defense Department to ameliorate the severity of
the Taft rules by amendment in July 1985.29 The amendment provided
that the period for debarments based on felony convictions normally
should be longer than one year, but that an agency could consider miti-
gating factors in making the debarment decision.295 The revised rules
cautioned, however, that the mitigating factors must demonstrate clearly
that the contractor had eliminated the circumstances leading to the con-
viction and implemented remedial measures for the debarring official to
be able to decide not to debar or to debar for less than one year.296
289. See 28 C.F.R. § 67.300 (1994).
290. See, e.g., Silverman v. United States Dep't of Defense, 817 F. Supp. 846, 849 (S.D.
Cal. 1993) (finding that the agency abused its discretion by not considering mitigating fac-
tors in debarring a contractor who had been convicted of misdemeanor conversion); Sellers
v. Kemp, 749 F. Supp. 1001, 1009-10 (W.D. Mo. 1990) (reversing debarment by finding that
the agency Secretary's designee abused her discretion by ignoring mitigating factors and
imposing a three-year debarment period). Notwithstanding Silverman, a conviction of var-
ious offenses can justify a three-year debarment whether felonies or misdemeanors. See 48
C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a)(1) to (4). The Robinson Co. v. Department of the Army, No. W-91-
CA-387, slip op. at 11-12 (W.D. Tex., Sept. 25, 1992) (holding that it was not arbitrary for
the agency to issue a debarment when the sole offender was the company's president and
owner who had not cooperated in the investigation and denied full responsibility despite
alleged mitigating factors); cf. Shane Meat Co. v. United States Dep't of Defense, 800 F.2d
334, 338-39 (3d Cir. 1986) (reversing a district court order that had reduced a debarment
based on a conviction from three years to a year and finding that an agency debarment
official had considered all relevant mitigating factors); Agan v. Pierce, 576 F. Supp. 257,
261-62 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (upholding a debarment based on a guilty plea after rejecting a
contention that the agency had not considered mitigating factors sufficiently).
291. See 50 Fed. Reg. 8121 (1985) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 209.406-4). Only the
Secretary of Defense (or an Under Secretary) could approve a decision to debar for a year
or less. Id The Secretary of Defense was not the usual debarring official for the military
services or other defense agencies.
292. Id. (amending 48 C.F.R. § 209.406-1(d)).
293. See Wallick, supra note 26, at 170.
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In 1986, the Final Report of the President's Blue Ribbon Commission
on Defense Management (known as the Packard Commission) discussed
the problems regarding suspension and debarment practices within the
Department of Defense. 2" In particular, the Packard Commission's final
report suggested that the Defense Department may have departed from
the FAR's policy goal that agencies use suspension and debarment strictly
as protection for the government against contractors lacking present re-
sponsibility.298 Additionally, the fact that the Defense Department had
been treating indictments as requiring automatic suspensions "without
sufficient regard for corrective actions already taken" troubled the Pack-
ard Commission.2" As a possible response to these concerns, the Pack-
ard Commission observed that the process could be improved "in crucial
respects" if the agencies amended the regulations to include criteria for
ascertaining when a contractor is presently responsible.3 °° Accordingly,
the Packard Commission offered potential criteria in the report.3"' Soon
297. THm PRESIDENT'S BLUE RIBBON COMMISSION ON DEFENSE MANAGEMENT, A
QUEST FOR EXCELLENCE 101-11 (1986) [hereinafter PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT].
298. Id. at 102. Although the Packard Commission Report recognized that "suspension
and debarment are indispensable tools in assuring that [the Department of Defense] not
contract with those lacking present responsibility, they nevertheless are severe remedies
that should be applied only in accordance with their stated purpose and legal standards."
Id. In a letter that included various recommendations, the ABA Section on Public Con-
tract Law had emphasized the need for the Packard Commission to focus on the issue of
present responsibility. See Myers Letter, supra note 218, at C-71.1 to -71.2. Indeed, the
Packard Commission appeared to address specific concerns that the ABA Section on Pub-
lic Contract Law expressed, such as its statement that "the potential effects of suspension
and debarment are so severe that this power must be properly circumscribed. The govern-
ment should impose suspension and debarment only on contractors who are not presently
responsible." Id at C-71.1. On the other hand, the Packard Commission did not appear to
embrace another proposal by the ABA Section on Public Contract Law to establish a cen-
tralized authority within the Defense Department to consider all suspension and debar-
ment cases. Id. at C-71.3. Instead, the Packard Commission recommended greater
uniformity in the various departments' procedures. See PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT,
supra note 297, at 109.
299. See PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 297, at 102.
300. Id. at 105.
301. Id. at 106. The recommended criteria included:
- The nature of integrity programs, if any, currently being implemented by the
contractor. The debarring/suspending authority should be particularly inter-
ested in the extent of the contractor's affirmative efforts to implement ethical
standards of conduct that address contract performance and systems of internal
controls to monitor compliance with those standards.
- The contractor's reputation for probity on recent procurements with [the De-
partment of Defense] and other federal agencies.
- The reputation of the contractor's management and directors in recent circum-
stances as persons of good character and integrity.
- The extent to which misconduct is symptomatic of basic systemic problems
within the corporation as opposed to isolated, aberrational corporate behavior.
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after the completion of the Packard Commission study, the Defense De-
partment departed from the original Taft rules and delineated certain
standards for mitigating factors and remedial measures. 3 2
The Defense Department's earlier insistence on a presumptive one-
year debarment under the Taft rules clearly contradicted the FAR's direc-
tive that agencies impose debarment only to protect the government "and
not for purposes of punishment."3"3 Therefore, the agency's retreat from
automatic debarments with presumptive "sentencing" to the acceptance
of consideration and analysis of published mitigating factors was an ap-
propriate step. These mitigating factors also should extend to the non-
procurement debarment and suspension rules.
Similarly, the FAR's suspension regulations direct that the existence of
a cause for suspension does not mean that an agency must suspend the
contractor. Instead, the suspending official should "consider the serious-
ness of the contractor's acts or omissions and may, but is not required to,
consider remedial measures or mitigating factors" such as those set forth
in the debarment rules.3°4 The suspension regulations also place the bur-
den on the contractor to bring evidence of any remedial measures or miti-
gating factors promptly to the agency's attention when the contractor has
reason to believe that a cause for suspension may exist.305
- The nature and extent of voluntary disclosure and cooperation offered by the
contractor in identifying and investigating the misconduct.
- The sufficiency of remedial measures taken to eliminate the causes of the
misconduct.
id.
302. See 52 Fed. Reg. 34,386, 34,387 (1987) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R. § 209.406-1(d)
(repealed)). Mitigating factors became a part of the FAR in 1992. See supra note 288 and
accompanying text. At about the same time, the Defense Department repealed its own list
of mitigating factors. See 56 Fed. Reg. 36,280 (1991) (deleting the Defense Department
mitigation factors because of the shift to the FAR). The Defense Department finally re-
moved the last vestiges of the Taft rules in 1992. See 57 Fed. Reg. 14,988, 14,992 (1992).
Congress forbidding any further implementation of the original Taft rules largely prompted
this final change. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-172, § 8110, 105 Stat. 1150, 1200 (1991).
303. 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (1993); see PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 297,
at 102; Wallick, supra note 26, at 172-73. Others also have expressed general doubt about
whether agencies actually have followed the spirit of the distinction between protection
and punishment in practice. See, e.g., Robert S. Bennett & Alan Kriegel, Negotiating
Global Settlements of Procurement Fraud Cases, 16 Pun. CoNT. L.J. 30, 33-34 (1986) (com-
menting on former Secretary of Defense Weinberger's remarks in a television interview
that an indictment of a government contractor requires an "'automatic suspension' ").
While punishment of high-profile contractors may have political appeal for appointed
agency officials, it still does not comport with the applicable regulations and policies under-
lying debarment action. See Shannon, supra note 5, at 30 n.144.
304. 48 C.F.R. § 9.407-1(b)(2) (1993).
305. See id. Moreover, the newly added Appendix H to the DFARS specifically adds
that "[a] contractor who becomes aware of a pending indictment or allegations of wrong-
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Unlike in the case for a debarment, however, if an agency is consider-
ing suspension, the agency need not provide prior notice to the contrac-
tor. Nonetheless, a contractor may well be aware of the existence of
causes that could precipitate a suspension (such as an ongoing criminal
investigation or the return of an indictment). In that situation, it may be
incumbent upon the contractor to take immediate remedial measures and
promptly approach the procuring agency in an effort to prevent a suspen-
sion.3°6 As in debarment proceedings, courts also could intervene in a
suspension case on behalf of a contractor if an agency fails to consider
mitigating factors or remedial measures.3°
doing that the contractor believes may lead to suspension or debarment action may contact
the debarring and suspending official or designee to provide information as to the contrac-
tor's present responsibility." 59 Fed. Reg. 27,662, 27,701 (1994) (to be codified at 48 C.F.R.
ch. 209, app. H-102(a)).
306. Cf Benjamin B. Klubes, The Department of Defense Voluntary Disclosure Pro-
gram, 19 PUB. CoNT. LJ. 504, 521-32 (1990) (describing possible benefits of the agency's
voluntary disclosure program whereby a contractor comes forward to address activities
that may give rise to debarment or suspension before an agency begins an investigation).
307. See, e.g., Resource Applications Inc. v. EPA, No. 93-2525 (D.D.C. Jan. 11, 1994),
cited in EPA Contractor Wins Preliminary Injunction Enjoining Suspension Imposed After
Indictment, 61 Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 115, 115 (Jan. 24, 1994) (granting a preliminary
injunction against an EPA suspension, which was based on an indictment where the agency
did not consider remedial measures and mitigating factors prior to issuing the suspension).
The case later became moot when the United States District Court for the Middle District
of North Carolina acquitted the contractor on the underlying criminal charges. See EPA
Firm Acquitted on False Claims Charges, Continues Effort to Have Suspension Lifted, 61
Fed. Cont. Rep. (BNA) 310, 310 (Mar. 7, 1994); see also ABA PRAcrr oNER's GUIDE,
supra note 4, at 156 (describing the company's various remedial measures, the relatively
small dollar value of the wrongdoing, and the lack of management knowledge of wrongdo-
ing as reasons to find that the EPA was arbitrary and capricious in imposing the
suspension).
One attorney from private practice who provided comments suggested that some general
criteria should be set out discussing the circumstances in which there should or should not
be a suspension even in light of an indictment or other reasonable certainty that a crime
may have been committed. Doke Letter, supra note 286, at 1. Specifically, Mr. Doke
suggested that the regulations be amended to add procedures that would encourage agen-
cies not to impose suspensions in return for the affected concern's commitment of coopera-
tion. Id. at 3. It does not seem that the FAR needs additional changes in this area at this
time, however. The addition of the list of mitigating factors to both versions of the debar-
ment and suspension procedures should provide a helpful baseline of consideration for
debarment and suspension officials. See supra note 288 and accompanying text (listing the
mitigating factors). Existing voluntary disclosure programs also play a role in limiting co-
operating entities' exposure. See ABA PAcrrrIONER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at 108-30
(describing various voluntary disclosure programs); Boese, supra note 26, at 12 (observing
that as of January 1, 1993, only one out of 118 defense contractors who had come forward
under the agency's voluntary disclosure program had been debarred). Moreover, an
agency's complete disregard for the types of mitigating factors and remedial measures that
the FAR identifies can result in judicial correction. See supra note 289 and accompanying
text (noting the absence of a list of mitigating factors in the nonprocurement regulations).
Nevertheless, for purposes of both consistency and fairness, amendments to the non-
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In 1992, the former Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition stated
that he was "concerned that contractors may not be aware that they are
being considered for suspension, '  Although recognizing that the FAR
does not require any pre-suspension notice to contractors, the Under Sec-
retary instructed:
When appropriate prior to the suspension, I want companies to
be informed that we have extremely serious concerns with their
conduct, that their suspension is imminent and that they may
contact the suspension official, or... designee, if they have any
information to offer on their behalf.3"
This suggestion, or requirement, that the Defense Department agencies
employ some form of "shock and alarm" or "show cause" letter is an
interesting development and certainly exceeds the constitutionally man-
dated process.31° Given that the regulations do not require an automatic
suspension even when grounds for suspension exist, agencies certainly
have the flexibility to take such a preliminary step. However, exactly
what the Under Secretary meant by "[w]hen appropriate" 311 remains to
be seen.312 Ironically, the Packard Commission had suggested that the
government should use a shock and alarm practice in suspension cases
several years earlier.31 3
procurement rules should add a similar list of mitigating factors and remedial measures.
Additionally, those agencies that do not have voluntary disclosure programs in place
should endeavor to do so.
.308. See Yockey Memo, supra note 101, at 1.
309. Id
310. Intriguingly, the memorandum also suggests that "It]his is not a change to existing
policy or an expansion of contractors' rights, but merely an enhanced opportunity for [De-
partment of Defense] to consider all available information before making a decision which
will affect a company's future business dealings with the government." Id
311. See supra note 309 and accompanying text.
312. One official who is familiar with the debarment and suspension process within the
Department of Defense indicated privately that the defense agencies had construed the
Under Secretary's term "when appropriate" as being fairly narrow. Moreover, in cases of
indictments or prolonged criminal investigations, the affected contractors should not be
surprised by the prospect of impending suspension actions.
313. See PACKARD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 297, at 107 .(suggesting that the
"practice of 'automatic' suspension of contractors following indictment on contract fraud
... be reconsidered by [the Department of Defense] with a view that it be more discrimi-
nating and take into account all circumstances of a particular situation"). Although the
Packard Commission Report spoke approvingly of the use of shock and alarm letters in-
stead of immediate suspensions, the Packard Commission offered no other concrete rec-
ommendations in this regard. In contrast, the ABA Section on Public Contract Law had
proposed a rules change to the Packard Commission that would have precluded the issu-
ance of a suspension in the absence of a prior agency hearing except upon a showing by the
government of irreparable harm. See Myers Letter, supra note 218, at C-71.4. The Under
Secretary's memorandum certainly does not go that far, but it is consistent with the sugges-
tion that the Packard Commission Report contains.
1995]
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The presence or absence of mitigating factors also relates to concerns
about disparities in treatment by government agencies among large and
small contractors. Small contractors have complained that they are the
subject of debarment and suspension actions more often than are larger
entities. Of course, larger concerns may be in a better position to incor-
porate the mitigating factors that the regulations identify. For example, a
company with many employees in multiple divisions may be much better
situated to "prune" away wrongdoers, incorporate mitigating factors, and
implement remedial measures than would a very small business.3 14 Al-
ternatively, in the case of a small contractor, those persons involved in
fraud or other grounds underlying the debarment or suspension also may
be key individuals in the operation of the concern; yet even the small
contractor can engage in remedial measures and can attempt to mitigate
the impact of prior problems.315
In sum, the addition of a specific list of mitigating factors and remedial
measures to the FAR has been a positive step in ensuring that agencies
impose debarment and suspension only to protect the government's inter-
ests and not for punishment. A similar list should be added to the non-
procurement rules. One other possibility for positive change with respect
to both sets of debarment and suspension procedures could be the devel-
opment of a list of "aggravating" factors. Such factors could offer gui-
dance to both agency officials and affected concerns regarding either (1)
the need for suspension or debarment or (2) the duration of a
debarment.316
IX. STATUTORY DEBARMENTS
In contrast to the administrative efforts to provide flexible limits on
debarment periods with a general maximum of three years, recent statu-
tory enactments either provide for mandatory, fixed periods of debar-
314. See Boese, supra note 26, at 11 (discussing the impact of company size on the use
of mitigating factors and remedial measures).
315. For example, an official of the DLA once stated that "[c]ontractors must recognize
that no one individual is indispensable. Even owners and chief operators of a small busi-
ness can be replaced by a soundly constructed trust agreement and competent trustee."
Karl W. Kabeiseman, Fraud in Defense Contracting: Debarment and Suspension as Admin-
istrative Remedies, in FRAUD IN GOVERNMENT CoNTRAcrIo 121, 131 (1985); cf. Robin-
son v. Cheney, 876 F.2d 152, 161 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that a business owner's transfer
of ownership to a trust did not protect the government's interests adequately because the
owner had retained both the right to receive income and a reversionary interest).
316. The debarring official for the Air Force has suggested the use of such a list of
aggravating factors to serve as a balance to the current mitigating factors. See Cook Letter,
supra note 94, at 3 (reflecting Ms. Cook's own views and not necessarily the official posi-
tion of the Air Force).
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ment or call for debarments in excess of three years. These mandatory or
extended debarment statutes, however, are inconsistent with the general
policy of imposing debarment or suspension primarily to protect the gov-
ernment and are more akin to additional penal sanctions.317
Yet, Congress undoubtedly has the constitutional authority to author-
ize the imposition of debarments as a form of punishment. Indeed, the
Supreme Court has upheld Congress' delegation of power to the agencies
to assess administrative civil penalties. 318 Congress, however, generally
has not enacted debarment statutes that are purely punitive in nature. 319
Nevertheless, congressional activity in this area over the last several years
reflects a trend toward more mandatory types of debarments and debar-
ment periods that exceed three years. If not expressly punitive, the legis-
lation suggests a trend toward de facto punishment.
A. Early Examples
Several statutes enacted decades ago have long mandated debarment
for particular contractual improprieties. Congress' first such effort was
the Buy American Act,32° which generally requires federal construction
contractors to use only products and materials manufactured in the
United States.32" ' Although the statute mandates debarment for a three-
year period from certain construction contracts, a conviction for violating
the statute also could constitute grounds for debarment from all federal
contracting as "a criminal offense in connection with ... performing a
public contract or subcontract. 322 In theory then, if a contractor violates
the Act, an agency can limit a debarment to the specific types of contracts
identified in the statute, but only to the extent that the debarring agency
is satisfied with the mitigating factors and remedial measures present.323
317. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.402(b) (1993); see also supra notes 286-87 and accompanying
text.
318. See Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 430 U.S.
442, 455 (1977) (upholding a statute authorizing an agency to impose administrative civil
penalties).
319. But see infra notes 320-43 (discussing certain statutes in which Congress has pre-
scribed automatic or extended debarments for violations of the terms of those statutes).
320. 41 U.S.C. §§ 10a-10d (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
321. Id § 10b(a). The statute, which was first enacted in 1933, specifically precludes the
award of any new "contract for the construction, alteration, or repair of any public building
or public work in the United States or elsewhere" to a violator of the Act for a three-year
period. Id. § 10b(b).
322. 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a)(1) (1993). A prior procurement regulation redundantly in-
cluded a willful violation of the Buy American Act as a specific cause for debarment. See
ABA PRAcrrno~NR's GuIDE, supra note 4, at 8 & n.9.
323. See supra notes 286-316 and accompanying text (discussing mitigating factors).
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Other early statutes also contain specific debarment provisions. For
example, several labor standards acts, such as the Davis-Bacon Act (and
related acts), 24 the Walsh-Healey Act,325 the Contract Work Hours and
Safety Standards Act,326 and the Service Contract Act of 1965,327 contain
debarment requirements. In addition to these labor statutes, certain en-
vironmental protection acts, such as the Clean Air Act 328 and the Clean
Water Act,329 include debarment provisions covering persons convicted
of statutory violations regarding contracts to be performed at the facili-
ties at which the improprieties arose.33 °
324. 40 U.S.C. §§ 276a to a-7 (1988). The statute requires federal construction contrac-
tors to pay certain wage rates set by the Secretary of Labor. Id. § 276a. The debarment
provision of the Davis-Bacon Act is set forth in section 276a-2(a), and it mandates a three-
year debarment for violators. Id. § 276a-2(a). The Secretary of Labor also is responsible
for setting wage rates with respect to some 60 other statutes. See 29 C.F.R. § 5.1 (1993).
Correspondingly, the Labor Department regulations provide for a three-year period of
ineligibility for any contractor that the agency finds to have violated the wage standards of
these statutes. See id. § 5.12. For cases arising under the Davis-Bacon Act, itself, the
agency refers its findings to the Comptroller General. Id. § 5.12(a)(2).
325. 41 U.S.C. §§ 35-45 (1988). The debarment provision is set forth in section 37, and
it requires a three-year debarment for violations of the provisions of the Act relating to
certain wage and hour requirements and certain working conditions, "[u]nless the Secre-
tary of Labor otherwise recommends." Id. § 37.
326. 40 U.S.C. §§ 327-33 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). This Act includes a debarment provi-
sion that requires the Secretary of Labor to impose a three-year debarment on contractors
engaged in "repeated willful or grossly negligent violations of [the Act]" by allowing em-
ployees in federal construction projects to work in unsanitary, hazardous, or dangerous
work surroundings. Id. § 333(d)(1)-(2). The Act does authorize the Secretary to lift a
debarment prior to the end of the three-year period upon being "satisfied that a contractor
or subcontractor whose name he has transmitted to the Comptroller General [as being
debarred] will thereafter comply responsibly with the requirements" of the pertinent por-
tions of the Act. Id. § 333(d)(2).
327. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-58 (1988). This statute covers wages, fringe benefits, and working
conditions for most federal service contracts. See d § 351(a). Section 354 directs the Sec-
retary of Labor to debar violators of the Act on a government-wide basis for three years
"[ulnless the Secretary otherwise recommends because of unusual circumstances." Id.
§ 354(a).
328. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-18571
(1988)).
329. Pub. L. No. 95-217, 62 Stat. 1155 (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988)).
330. See 33 U.S.C. § 1368 (1988); 42 U.S.C. § 7606 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). A listing
under these statutes would not necessarily be as broad as a debarment from all federal
contracting given that the statutes apply only to the sites of the violations. This program
has been implemented further through Executive Order No. 11,738, 38 Fed. Reg. 25,161
(1973), and EPA regulations. 40 C.F.R. § 15 (1993). For a detailed discussion of the EPA's
contractor listing program under these statutes, see ABA PRAcTmONER'S GuIDE, supra
note 4, at 90, 94-96; DeVecchio & Engel, supra note 26, at 57-65.
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B. Recent Enactments
In more recent years, Congress has added new statutory debarment
provisions in an aggressive fashion. For example, with respect to defense
procurement fraud, Congress now has barred individuals convicted of
fraud or other felonies arising out of Department of Defense contracts
from working on most defense contracts for at least five years.3 3' This
exclusionary period is mandatory unless the Secretary of Defense deter-
mines that a waiver is necessary "in the interests of national security. 33 2
This exclusion appears both redundant and unduly punitive, however, be-
cause the FAR already authorizes debarment of an individual who has
been convicted of fraud or other offenses related to procurement con-
tracts.333 Moreover, under the FAR, any such debarment would be per-
missive, generally limited to three years, and theoretically susceptible to
limitation based on a satisfactory showing of mitigating factors.
331. 10 U.S.C. § 2408 (1988 & Supp. V. 1993). Specifically, any such individual is
barred from the following:
(A) Working in a management or supervisory capacity on any defense contract
or any first tier subcontract of a defense contract.
(B) Serving on the board of directors of any defense contractor or any subcon-
tractor awarded a contract directly by a defense contractor.
(C) Serving as a consultant to any defense contractor or any subcontractor
awarded a contract directly by a defense contractor.
(D) Being involved in any other way, as determined under regulations pre-
scribed by the Secretary of Defense, with a defense contract or first tier subcon-
tract of a defense contract.
Id § 2408(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). The statute also includes a criminal sanction subjecting
any defense contractor or subcontractor to a criminal penalty of up to $500,000 if convicted
of knowingly (1) employing an individual under this prohibition, or (2) allowing the barred
individual to be a member of the contractor's board of directors. Id. § 2408(b).
332. Id § 2408(a)(3). This subsection also mandates that the Secretary provide a report
to Congress justifying any such waiver. Id
333. See 48 C.F.R. § 9.406-2(a) (1993). In addition, because of concerns about an
agency considering a contractor to be an "affiliate" of a debarred individual or having that
individual's lack of responsibility taint a firm's perceived responsibility, most responsible
contractors would be reluctant to employ a debarred individual in one of the capacities
that the statute identifies, even in the absence of the criminal sanctions contained therein.
See id. §§ 9.403, 9.406-5(a) (defining affiliate and describing the possible imputation of an
individual's conduct to a company).
334. See id §§ 9.406-1(a), 9.406-4. Of course, an individual who is convicted of pro-
curement fraud may be unable to satisfy many of the mitigating factors and remedial meas-
ures that the FAR identifies. Nonetheless, the virtually absolute five-year prohibitions set
forth in 10 U.S.C. § 2408 are clearly punitive and inconsistent with more flexible efforts to
assure a contractor's present responsibility. See supra notes 286-316 and accompanying
text (discussing the FAR's mitigating factors). A section of the recent procurement
streamlining legislation removes the application of 10 U.S.C. § 2408 to contracts under the
revised simplified acquisition threshold ($100,000). See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 712, supra
note 62, at 102.
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Other recent congressional enactments have included specific debar-
ment provisions. For example, the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 re-
quires. most federal contractors and grantees to maintain drug-free
workplaces. 335 The statute includes a presumptive five-year period of de-
barment from obtaining contracts and grants for violations of the stat-
ute.336 Similarly, the Customs and Trade Act of 1990331 permits the
heads of appropriate agencies to debar violators from obtaining new con-
tracts for purchasing unprocessed timber from federal lands for up to five
years.338 Another statute requires the Secretary of Defense to make a
debarment determination within ninety days following a person's convic-
tion "of intentionally affixing a label bearing a 'Made in America' inscrip-
tion to any product sold in or shipped to the United States that is not
made in America. ' 339 Although this statute does not mandate a debar-
ment, if the Secretary decides not to debar, he or she must provide a
report to Congress. 34 This reporting requirement no doubt creates
strong pressure on the Secretary to take debarment action.
With respect to nonprocurement programs, a section of the current So-
cial Security laws provides an extensive debarment requirement. 341 That
provision includes both mandatory and permissive "exclusions" from par-
ticipation as a provider in the Medicare program or state health care pro-
grams because of a conviction for certain offenses or other delineated
causes." 2 Moreover, in addition to the enactments delineated above,
335. 41 U.S.C. § 701-17 (1988).
336. Id § 701(b), 702(b)(3). Although the statute does not mandate a five-year pe-
riod, that is the maximum period set forth.
337. 16 U.S.C. §§ 620-620j (Supp. V 1993). The statute generally forbids individuals
and organizations from exporting timber that originates from federal lands. Id. § 620a(a).
338. Id. § 620d(d). The statute also permits the pertinent agencies to cancel pending
contracts with violators of the statute. Id.
339. 10 U.S.C. § 2410f(a) (Supp. V 1993); see also Defense Production Act Amend-
ments of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-558, § 202, 106 Stat. 4220, 4220 (requiring an amendment to
the FAR to identify a violation of the "Made in America" label rules as a specific ground
for debarment). Section 201 of this Act also requires an amendment to the FAR to iden-
tify the commission of certain unfair trade practices as another basis for debarment. De-
fense Production Act Amendments of 1992, § 201, 106 Stat. at 4220.
340. 10 U.S.C. § 2410f(a). The Defense Department recently deleted a DFARS regula-
tion that specified a period of debarment for violators of the "Made in America" label
statute "because the statutory mandate to specify the period of debarment was not contin-
ued in the Fiscal Year 1994 Defense Appropriations Act." 59 Fed. Reg. 27,662, 27,663
(1994) (repealing the regulation formerly codified at DFARS 9.406-4, 48 C.F.R. § 209.406-
4).
341. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
342. Id. The mandatory exclusions are for convictions of program-related crimes or
patient abuse and must last for at least five years. See i& § 1320a-7(a), (c)(3)(B). The
permissive exclusions relate to a variety of convictions or other specified causes. IL.
§ 1320a-7(b). With regard to certain violations, Congress has required the agency to con-
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Congress recently has enacted still more statutory debarment
provisions.
343
C. Punishment or Protection?
In addition to recommending a cap of three years for debarments, the
ACUS Temporary Conference counseled against nondiscretionary statu-
tory debarments over three decades ago. After examining the then-ex-
isting statutory debarments, the Temporary Conference recommended
that Congress amend the absolute debarment penalties of statutes such as
the Buy American Act and the Davis-Bacon Acts to permit discretionary
imposition of the scope and period of statutory debarments. 43 " The Tem-
porary Conference also spoke approvingly of the presence of such discre-
tion under the Walsh-Healey Act." s
In his mid-1970s review of the debarment and suspension process for
the ACUS, Professor Steadman noted the general lack of congressional
activity in the debarment and suspension field at that time.' He ex-
pressed "wonder ... that Congress ha[d] not enacted more statutes ex-
pressly authorizing debarment to further desired social or economic
goals." 7  With decided insight, Mr. Steadman also observed that
duct a hearing before an administrative law judge prior to the imposition of a permissive
exclusion. See id. § 1320a-7(f)(2).
343. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 335a(a)-(c) (Supp. V 1993) (providing for mandatory and
permissive debarments from submitting certain drug applications for violations relating to
the drug approval process, where the debarment periods range from one to ten years, but
can be permanent in the case of repeat violations); cf 12 U.S.C. § 93(c) (Supp. V 1993)
(providing for the forfeiture of bank franchises for violations of certain money laundering
offenses (in a process similar to debarment including mitigating factors comparable to
those which the FAR sets forth)); 20 U.S.C. § 954(1) (Supp. IV 1992) (precluding artists
from receiving further grants from the National Endowment for the Arts if they use agency
financial assistance for projects that the agency determines to be obscene; the agency may
not issue further grants until the amount of the "violating" grant is repaid). For a more
detailed discussion of these statutes, see ABA PRAcrIoNER's GUIDE, supra note 4, at 44-
51.
344. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 295 (Recommendation
29-9).
345. Id. The Report stated that "Congress ... conferred such discretion on the Secre-
tary of Labor with regard to debarments under the Walsh-Healey Act, and the Committee
believes the same considerations support amendment of the Buy American and Davis-
Bacon Acts." Id. Interestingly, the Report observed that the review committee had re-
ceived no objections to this particular recommendation. Id. As a historical note, notwith-
standing the recommendation, the Buy American Act and the Davis-Bacon Act still
include mandatory debarment language. See 40 U.S.C. § 276a-2(a) (1988); 41 U.S.C.
§ 10b(b) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
346. See Steadman, supra note 8, at 801-02. His report identified the then-existing de-
barment statutes as included in the various labor standards acts described above, the Buy
American Act and the early 1970s environmental statutes. Id at 801.
347. Id at 802.
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"[g]iven the potential of the leverage, the Clean Air and Water Pollution
Control Act amendments may presage things to come."'
As discussed above, Congress certainly has become more active in
passing legislation to sanction or require debarments or exclusions from
government programs in a variety of contexts. There is little doubt that
Congress has the authority to pursue social or economic goals through
penal debarment enactments. 9 On the other hand, mandatory debar-
ments for stated periods clearly depart from the pure protection of gov-
ernmental interests and become a form of punishment that should
warrant greater procedural protection."' Mandatory debarment statutes
eliminate an agency's ability to be flexible with regard to limiting or lift-
ing a debarment upon satisfactory proof of mitigating factors or remedial
measures. Certainly, some of the statutes identified above neither man-
date debarment nor eliminate administrative discretion.
Conversely, many of these same statutes provide for debarments for
specific violations to be as long as five years or longer. If a statutory
debarment is intended to be a forecast of a period of presumed nonre-
sponsibility because of past wrongdoing, there does not appear to be any
reason for more recent statutes to mandate a debarment period of five
years as opposed to the traditional administrative presumption of three
years for other convictions and improprieties.351 Moreover, congres-
sional identification of particular statutory violations as constituting
grounds for debarment appears both overtly political and redundant in
nature. Under the regulations, an agency already may debar a contractor
348. Id
349. The former chair of the ABA's Section on Public Contract Law summarized this
issue several years ago in explaining why suspension and debarment should involve a focus
on present responsibility, not punishment:
If Congress desires to create such a penalty, namely, a period of time during
which a contractor is to be precluded from doing business with the government as
a punishment for past offenses, it may do so; however, any such punishment must
be circumscribed with the same kind of protections which are traditionally avail-
able when the government seeks punishment for past offenses.
Myers Letter, supra note 218, at C-71.2.
350. But see Manocchio v. Kusserow, 961 F.2d 1539, 1542 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that
a five-year mandatory exclusion under the Medicare statutes resulting from a $62.40 fraud-
ulent claim was not punishment for purposes of the Double Jeopardy or Ex Post Facto
clauses of the Constitution). In finding that the exclusion was not punitive, the court dis-
tinguished United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989), which had held that the
Double Jeopardy Clause is implicated when a criminal defendant, who is punished follow-
ing a prosecution, also is the subject of a later punitive civil sanction. Mannocchio, 961
F.2d at 1542.
351. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 294 (describing a debar-
ment as "essentially a presumption or forecast of continuing nonresponsibility as a govern-
ment contractor based on past misconduct").
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based on broad grounds, such as a conviction for fraud or a criminal of-
fense in connection with a federal contract; commission of an offense
such as theft, bribery, or making false statements; other offenses indicat-
ing a lack of business integrity or honesty, which seriously impact upon
the contractor's present responsibility; or any other serious cause im-
pugning the contractor's present responsibility. 312 Consequently, it ap-
pears that there is no need for separate statutes to list, as causes for
debarment, violations of matters such as "Made in America" rules or
Drug-Free Workplace limitations.
As the Temporary Conference recommended in 1962, Congress should
act to remove statutory provisions that impose mandatory debarments
and authorize administrative discretion with respect to imposing any such
statutory debarments.353 Similarly, Congress should permit agencies to
act with discretion concerning the period of any statutory debarments.354
It also should employ a general limit of three years as the administrative
arena provides. 355 By employing these prophylactic measures and re-
fraining from enacting a panoply of quasi-punitive sanctions, Congress
can achieve comparable social and economic goals.356
X. CONCLUSION
The 1962 ACUS Temporary Conference report on debarment and sus-
pension identified many procedural flaws and weaknesses in the then-
existing practices concerning the debarment and suspension of federal
contractors. Now, over three decades later, many of the changes recom-
mended in 1962 have come to pass. Although these changes have
evolved slowly at times, the general procedural protections afforded to
contractors have improved. Moreover, the applicability of these sanc-
tions has expanded into the nonprocurement arena through the develop-
ment of generally similar procedures. Undoubtedly, a certain level of
352. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-2(a)(1), (3), (4), -2(c) (1993).
353. See TEMPORARY CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 9, at 295 (Recommendations
29-9).
354. See supra note 270 and accompanying text (explaining the FAR's broad grant of
discretion).
355. See supra note 271 and accompanying text. Of course, agencies may exceed the
regulatory presumptive period of three years in an exceptional case or extend a debarment
based on new facts. See 48 C.F.R. §§ 9.406-4(a)-(b).
356. In a meeting conducted as part of the research for this project with several mem-
bers of the Debarment and Suspension Committee of the ABA Public Contract Law Sec-
tion (including the Chair), those present expressed strong concerns about the nature of the
congressional activity in this area over the last several years. Interview with Richard
Bednar, Chair, & Various Members, Debarment & Suspension Committee, ABA Public
Contract Law Section, in Washington, D.C. (May 6, 1994).
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tension always will exist between the government's efforts to ensure that
it contracts or enters into other business relationships only with responsi-
ble concerns and the private sector's attempts to demonstrate present re-
sponsibility despite alleged or actual prior wrongdoing. The procedural
protections now in place represent a fair and reasonable framework for
balancing these competing interests and, beyond the specific recommen-
dations discussed above, major changes probably are not warranted at
this time. On the other hand, agency officials should bear in mind the
significant duties that the debarment and suspension regulations entrust
to them, and they should use sound judgment in exercising their substan-
tial discretion.
XI. ADDENDUM
On January 19, 1995, members of the Administrative Conference of the
United States (ACUS) met in plenary session to consider Professor Shan-
non's Article and various ACUS Committee recommendations. As a re-
sult, the ACUS adopted Recommendation 95-2 relating to debarment
and suspension from federal programs.?
357. Office of the Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, Recom-
mendation 95-2: Debarment and Suspension from Federal Programs (adopted Jan. 19,
1995). Recommendation 95-2 states:
I. Entities coordinating the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the
Common Rule for nonprocurement debarment, and individual agencies in their
procurement and nonprocurement debarment and suspension regulations, should
promptly ensure that the applicable regulations provide that suspensions or de-
barments from either federal procurement activities or federal nonprocurement
activities have the effect of suspension or debarment from both, subject to waiver
and exception procedures.
II. Entities coordinating the FAR and the Common Rule, and individual agen-
cies in their regulations, should ensure that:
A. cases involving disputed issues of material fact are referred to adminis-
trative law judges, military judges, administrative judges of boards of con-
tract appeals, or other hearing officers who are guaranteed similar levels of
independence for hearing and for preparation of (1) findings of fact certified
to the debarring official; (2) a recommended decision to the debarring offi-
cial; or (3) an initial decision, subject to any appropriate appeal within the
agency.
B. debarring officials in each agency should:
1. be senior agency officials;
2. be guaranteed sufficient independence to provide due process; and
3. in cases where the agency action is disputed, ensure that any infor-
mation on which a decision to debar or suspend is based appears in the
record of the decision
HI. Entities coordinating the FAR and the Common Rule, and individual agen-
cies in their regulations, should provide that each regulatory scheme for suspen-
sion and debarment includes:
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A. a list of mitigating and aggravating factors that an agency should con-
sider in determining (1) whether to debar or suspend and (2) the term for
any debarment;
B. a process for determining a single agency to act as the lead agency on
behalf of the government in pursuing and handling a case against a person or
entity that has transactions with multiple agencies;
C. (with respect to procurement debarment only) a minimum evidentiary
threshold of at least "adequate evidence of a cause to debar" to issue a notice
of proposed debarment;
D. a requirement that all respondents be given notice of the potential gov-
ernment-wide impact of a suspension or debarment, as well as the applicabil-
ity of any such action to both procurement and nonprocurement programs;
and
E. encouragement for the use of "show cause" letters in appropriate cases.
IV. All federal agencies in the executive branch (broadly construed to include
"independent" agencies) should implement the "Common rule" and FAR rules
on suspension and debarment.
V. Congress should ordinarily refrain from limiting agencies' discretion by man-
dating suspensions, debarments, or fixed periods of suspension or debarment.
Congress should also review existing laws that mandate suspensions, debarments,
and fixed periods, to determine whether to amend the provisions to permit
agency discretion to make such determinations.
Id at 7-8 (footnotes omitted).
1995]

